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"I concur with my noble friend (Lord Hawkesbury) in thinking, that, so far as our *security* is concerned, the extension of French territory ought to excite no immediate alarm; and that, relative to France, we are now in *a state of greater security than in any former period of our history.* The dangers which may flow from the extension of territory, are *not the dangers of the present moment*: they can only be dangers of a *remote period*; a period by *far too remote* to be calculated upon in judging of the effects of the present peace."—LORD CASTLEREAGH'S SPEECH, MAY 14, 1802.

AN ENQUIRY INTO THE NATURE OF THE CONTINENTAL POLITICS OF GREAT-BRITAIN AND THE CAUSES OF THE PRESENT WAR.

——— *Terrorum et fraudis abunde est;*
Stant belli causæ.——VIRGIL.

Engaged as we are so soon again in hostilities with France, with very little hopes of terminating our differences either by negotiation, or under the arbitration of any foreign power, it has very properly been asked, could we have avoided the present contest consistently with the honour and dignity of this nation? Mutual complaints have, for some time, filled the public prints of both nations: our minds are inflamed with real or supposed injuries: the ancient enmity between this country and France, which no length of time, no fortune can eradicate, has broke out, and war, whether from necessity or design, seems not so much to be dreaded as sought. I revere that gallant, unconquerable spirit of my countrymen, which supported them, during the late bloody contest, amidst the wreck and dissolution of nations, and struck terror into their enemies before whom the rest of Europe fell down in abject submission. I honour that patriotic zeal and firmness which they now display on the eve of a war, which, God knows, may excede all the former in its horrors and duration. But let us not rashly stake, if it be possible to prevent it, the existence of our nation; the tranquillity of our colonies, and the safety of Europe upon the event of a war, entered into, it may be, without sufficient grounds, and execrated when too late to retreat with honour. It is of the utmost importance for the people to be satisfied with the conduct of their rulers. In time of war, nothing can be of greater moment to the internal peace and security of the nation. We may be unavoidably forced to draw the sword; but if there is the least ground to suppose, that, either through indecision, or want of firmness, or, what may sometimes give rise to both, a dread of losing the honours and emoluments of office, to which the honour of this country has more than once been sacrificed, we are ultimately involved in the calamities of war, the just indignation of the people will at length rise against the authors of their dishonour and their sufferings. The last war unfortunately divided the sentiments of the people. By some, it was accounted just and necessary; by others, oppressive and odious. And hence it was, that an active opposition retarded the plans of the minister, and gave countenance to those restless, ambitious men, who, dazzled with imaginary greatness, wished to rise upon their country's dishonour. I hope that the present contest is begun with clearer views of its necessity. I hope that it will unite all our hearts and hands in the defence of our country. And, if it can be shewn, that we have been driven upon it by the united designs of treachery, ambition, and envy; that our respectability in the eyes of other powers is at stake; that our existence as a nation is endangered; that our religion, laws, and liberties, for which alone life is worth possessing, are all menaced; we shall then, I hope, feel but one sentiment, to act as becomes the honour and dignity of Britons; to fight, if it be necessary, at the tombs of our fathers, in defence of that independence, of that religion, and of that proud, unsullied honour, which they transmitted to their posterity as the noblest gift they could bequeath.

The known character of the First Consul of the French, is a sufficient ground for jealousy and alarm. His great military talents; his unsatiable ambition; his despotic power; his violent measures; his unblushing perfidy; his open and secret treachery, are all formidable, suspicious, and dangerous. The animosity he is known to bear against this country, which alone turned back the tide of his ambition and deprived him of the much wished for name of a second Alexander, never left him, even amidst the pacific congratulations of ambassadors, and the lively feelings of an oppressed, miserable people. The conduct which he has pursued towards the unresisting powers up-

on the Continent is a proof both of his ambition and the little respect he pays to the rights of nations. By breaking the spirit of resistance, and forcing them to crouch under the banners of France, he has made them, instead of independent states, the abject slaves of his will; the miserable subjects of his rapacity and extortion, the wretched victims of his perfidy and ambition. I will not shew him in that accommodating garb in which he wished to become all things to all men. I will not raise the abhorrence of my countrymen, whom I know to be religious, against the most sacrilegious conduct the world ever witnessed. I will not hold up to view the speckled features of his religious transformations, from the adoration of the naked Goddess of Liberty, and the soothing idea of an eternal sleep, to the joys of a Mahometan Paradise, and the blessed society of the faithful. Such a daring outrage to all religious opinions would have called down the vengeance of Greece or Rome upon the impious wretch; but which, by a Frenchman, will be considered as a mark of greatness of mind, and a happy stroke of political sagacity. Let us pardon his past failings, for he is now a good Christian, and desires his pious bishops to offer up prayers to the Almighty, that he may prosper in his injustice and villainy. Here too we trace the features of his character, for it is in every respect singular and consistent. From the Palace of St. Cloud he issues mandates that astonish Europe, as well by their novelty as their injustice. Amidst the representatives of Sovereigns, his rage breaks out with all the acrimony and insolence of a leader of banditti, traversed in his schemes of rapine and plunder. Before the eyes of Europe he acts the political madman; and the boldness and singularity of his gestures and actions are really astonishing. His paroxysms would be highly amusing were he deprived of the means of rendering them dangerous. To the voice and sentiments of mankind he pays no regard. To the authority of religion he is too great and too unprincipled to submit. Few despots are proof against the keen attacks of public censure. They endeavour to colour over their injustice with some plausible pretence; and it is not until they are dead to all shame, and regardless of the opinion either of contemporaries or of posterity that they venture upon actions which transmit their names with infamy to all eternity. They may disregard the sullen curses of the miserable wretches subject to their authority; but they ought to be considered as [illegible] indeed in villany if they do not feel sore at the generous indignation of a free and independent people. But the Chief Consul, if he be a despot, is a hero also; and heroes must not be confined, like ordinary men, within the bounds of old prescriptions, and the beaten track of dull uniformity. They must astonish by their actions. They must force their way over the neck of laws, and rights, and opinions, and justice, and every thing which other men hold sacred. How else should they be known to be heroes? And who does not know that the greatest heroes are the greatest madmen? Satan in his Palace of Pandemonium would scarcely have been distinguished from his infernal counsellors, had he not had the daring to issue out at hell gates to explore and ruin the world.

"As when a *Vulture* on Imaus bred,
Whose snowy ridge the roving Tartar bounds,
Dislodging from a region scarce of prey,
To gorge the flesh of lambs or yearling kids
On hills where flocks are fed, flies towards the springs
Of *Ganges* or *Hydaspes, Indian* streams,
But in his way lights on the barren plains
Of Sericana."

The conduct of the First Consul towards this country, if it has not been equally violent as towards other nations, did not proceed from any regard to justice, but from a well grounded fear of openly enraging a high spirited and formidable people. He knew our strength; he had felt our power; he shrunk from our vengeance. Like a fugitive and deserter he fled from his brave army in Egypt to usurp the ancient throne of the Bourbons. From that time till the present moment, power has been his object, and he has but too well succeeded. We alone had the courage to oppose him, and to oppose him with vigour. Our success in the late war, notwithstanding the defection of our allies, was such as to warrant us to prescribe terms instead of receiving them. We had taken from France the best part of her West-India possessions, and all that she held in the East. We had almost annihilated her navy. The remnant of her ships were either rotting in her harbours, or taken successively by our cruizers. All her attempts upon us baffled by the vigilance of our ministers and the skill and bravery of our sailors and soldiers. What then did France gain from us? Not an inch of territory: not the shadow of an advantage. We indeed felt sorely the perfidy and distresses of our allies; and it was for them we made so many sacrifices. For ourselves, we did not despair. We stood firm as a rock; growing every day more formidable as dangers thickened around us. The

Chief Consul, aware of all these advantages on our side, made some concessions, which, it is plain, he never meant to ratify. He probably thought, that, could he once make us drop our arms, we would not suddenly resume them, though he should continue to wound us through the subjugation of Switzerland, the oppression of Holland, and Sebastiani's famous mission. He thought, no doubt, that, since we were almost entirely excluded from the Continent, we would not have the boldness to encounter him *single-handed*. He certainly valued himself much upon his dextrous policy in forcing the continental powers to withdraw from our alliance; and not without reason. It appears to have been the intention of France, for more than a century, to loos n our connexion with those nations on the Continent, who, apprehending danger from her growing power, had joined in a strict alliance with us. Our statesmen were, however, better acquainted with the interests of this country; and those nations knew too well the value of our alliance, to suffer France to obtain this important end. Louis XIV. entertained the same ambitious views as Buonaparté; but Europe was preserved from slavery, chiefly by the exertions of this country, conducted by the abilities of a man who, to the talents of a great general, united those of a consummate statesman and politician. France was driven within her ancient limits; and only saved by the dissensions which broke out among the confederates. The issue of last war has not been so favourable to Europe. During the course of it we lost our allies one after another. The King of Prussia basely betrayed us. The Dutch, most fatally for their own interest and independence, threw themselves into the arms of France. Spain, after a few feeble efforts, joined the conqueror. The intrigues of the Italian powers vanished before French ferocity. Some of the smaller states have been blotted out of existence, and others have risen upon their ruins. Russia, after making a considerable impression upon France, withdrew from the common alliance, and was only prevented, by the premature death of her Sovereign, from turning her arms against us. And the Emperor of Germany, our only valuable and best tried ally, forced, by a train of defeats, to conclude a treaty in which we were not comprehended. Thus, after a series of events which have no parallel, partly occasioned by ill-judged policy, perfidy, and weakness, on the one hand and by a spirit of enthusiasm, ambition, irresistible power, and astonishing success, on the other, we found ourselves deserted by our allies, and left to maintain the combat alone. Thus, that balance of power, which cost our ancestors so much blood and treasure, and which cost us little less to maintain, has, for the present, by unforeseen events, been in a great measure overturned. We are now to consider France as the most dangerous enemy to the liberties of Europe, and as avowedly aiming at universal empire. Viewing her in this light, what are we to do? Ought we to sit quietly down, and give up the cause as hopeless? Ought we to look quietly on and see her hem us in on every side by her conquests? We ought surely more than ever to make the balance of power the object of our thoughts, and direct all our measures for restoring it to its proper level. The language of Buonaparté upon this head is equally unjust to this country, and insulting to the other nations of Europe. Rightly interpreted, it runs thus: "The powers upon the Continent are all under the dominion and protection of France. Not one of them dares move without her permission. They have it not in their power to conclude, or break off alliances. You alone are our rivals. But you are our rivals only by sea. On the Continent you have no ally, no force, no interest." Such language, the weakness alone of Germany ought to prevent her from chastising. But we ought, from the first, to have remonstrated with spirit, and if remonstrances were of no avail, to have followed them up by action.

From our insular situation we never can endanger the liberties of any nation upon the Continent, nor acquire any permanent authority among them, farther than mutual interest may promote. We have long since abandoned the idea of continental conquests. All the efforts we have made in that quarter were either intended to divide the power of France, or, more frequently, to protect our allies. But the situation and views of France are very different. She has shewn herself both able and inclined to wrest from them their independence, laws, and possessions. She maintained herself, during the greatest part of the late war, at their expense. And, had it not been for the defeats she received from us, defeats which checked her pride and taught her to stop in the career of conquest, all Europe, and, perhaps, most of Asia, would, ere now, have been subject to her power. There cannot be a doubt, that, should France ever have the good fortune to ruin our navy (which God forbid!) the balance of power in Europe would be entirely lost; and she may

then go on conquering and to conquer, acquiring an increase of strength from every new accession of territory. Nor is this altogether improbable while she commands such an extensive line of coast. From the mouth of the Elbe,* it takes a wide sweep along the German and Atlantic Ocean up the shores of the Mediterranean. It bounds the most fertile and populous countries in Europe. I know that other means are necessary to create a great and respectable navy fit to cope with ours. But these means, I affirm, France has been labouring to obtain: first, by excluding us from the Continent: next, by preventing all British manufactures from entering France and the countries subject to her: then, from a treacherous design to seize upon our colonies and obtain Malta: and, lastly, to invade this country and subject it under her dominion. This has been the avowed design of the Chief Consul both before and since the signing of the treaty of Amiens. This is an important consideration. It interests us most nearly. It ought to be guarded against with the most scrupulous care. But it cannot be indifferent even to the independent nations of Europe. Should France succeed in conquering this country, what other power is there that could make head against her? In our fall would be involved that of Europe. The existence, the success of the continental powers depend upon our existence and success. We deprive France, by our navy, of the sinews of war. Put her in possession of these; put her in possession of our immense wealth, of our navy, of our colonies, and what other power ever was or will be more formidable? Do you suppose that the northern nations would then be able to cope with her? No: they are at too great a distance to stop her in her career and lie out of the direct line of conquest. She will not attack them until she has over-run all Germany and Italy, and broken asunder the feeble Ottoman Empire. One might naturally suppose that a sense of their own danger and the liberty of Europe should rouse them before it be too late. At present they may do much either as arbitrators or parties; and effectually assist us in raising the Emperor of Germany to his former influence and authority, and in reducing France within her ancient limits, where alone she will cease to be formidable. The policy of France in supporting Prussia against the Emperor has tended much to their mutual aggrandisement. But it must have fatal effects. It has weakened the only power upon the Continent capable of resisting the French. It has raised Prussia, the natural rival of Austria, from a subordinate rank in which she could never be dangerous, to a pitch of power equal, if not superior to her rival; and given her the means of preventing the immense power of the Germanic body from being turned against France. Something similar to this was the conduct of the Elector of Bavaria in the time of Louis XIV. He too was the rival of the then Emperor. But he fell, and his fall ought to be an instructive lesson to his more powerful imitator. The King of Prussia, if he be possessed of any political sagacity, ought to consider, that France has employed him merely as the tool of her ambition to humble the power

* The French have taken possession of Hanover, and also, it is said, of Hamburgh and other free maritime towns in Germany. These are acquisitions which ought to alarm every State upon the Continent, but more particularly the Germans themselves. The avowed design of the First Consul is to exclude our manufactures and commerce from the whole of the Continent. This measure involves in it a train of evils which will not fall so heavily upon this country as upon Germany and France herself. The commerce of France and her maritime allies, it is to be hoped, will be soon entirely ruined by the superiority of our fleets. Germany has no foreign possessions, nor foreign trade. The Northern nations possess nearly as little, and cannot furnish her with those commodities which she has been accustomed to receive from us. She will find it almost impossible to want them. And France herself will sustain a heavy loss by the interruption of that contraband trade of British manufactures, which, in spite of the jealousy and vigilance of his Consular Majesty, was poured in upon her through the medium of Germany. What will be the consequence? France will either be obliged to give up the free towns or incense every state upon the Continent so much against her, that she will be attacked by enemies on every side. Even the politic and avaricious Prussian will find his interest severely wounded by destroying the liberty of the free towns. Perhaps it would be better for this country, while her navy blocks up the French fleets and armies in their ports, that the Germans submitted patiently to this act of injustice and robbery. The First Consul must keep up numerous armies, but how shall he pay them when he has no provinces to plunder, no commerce to tax? Let the continental powers think of this. If we keep him at bay, as I hope in God we shall, whenever he is straitened, he will seek a pretence to invade Italy or Germany, and gather the gleanings of his former rapacity. We are threatened with burdens and dangers, but they are threatened with the loss of every thing; and, what is worse, they seem so overawed by France, or so jealous of us, that they never make the least remonstrance. Their supineness is astonishing. They are not aware that the most temporising among them will only be the last victim of Consular ambition. Implacable hatred to this country is the pretence, lawless ambition the object of the politics of St. Cloud.

of Austria, and, that sooner or later, if he does not take care to prevent it, she will strip him of all that power which she permitted him to acquire for her own selfish ends.

Any person, who will take the trouble to consider the present humbled state of most of the nations upon the Continent, and the formidable power and ambition of France, will easily perceive that the contest, on the side of France, is for universal empire; on our side, for self defence and the maintenance of the balance of power. We are not accessories; we are principals in the present war. It is the interest of the other nations of Europe to look up to us for protection. It is their interest to coalesce with us in humbling France. Had the Dutch, instead of that mean jealousy of our power, which induced them, about the commencement of the last war, to open their gates to the French and receive the fraternal hug which, I believe, has squeezed them pretty well, imitated the conduct of their ancestors, and joined cordially in the league against France, affairs might have taken a different turn. Their defection and the dissensions which arose among the allies ruined the cause. Divided counsels and separate views weaken and destroy the general interest It is unfortunate that there was not at that time at the head of the confederates a man of superior rank and talents who could unite so many jarring interests in one. Such a man as Marlborough is not always to be found. But without the abilities of a Marlborough a confederation is feeble and divided. The same mean jealousy, which formerly proved fatal to them, ought not now to subsist among the continental powers. We then fought in defence of their freedom, but we now fight for our own in conjunction with theirs, without the smallest views of aggrandisement. Let them think of this; if they prove enemies, we can ruin their commerce, but we cannot injure their independence. We can prove a better ally, but not such a formidable enemy as France.

It ought to be the policy of the small states upon the Continent to attach themselves to some respectable power, from which they can have nothing to fear, but which is capable of protecting or assisting them against a formidable and ambitious neighbour. Such was the system of policy pursued by the Italian States in the fifteenth or sixteenth centuries. They carried it, however, too far, and refined themselves at length out of their independence. Such also was the system of policy practised by the States of Greece during the Peloponnesian war; and afterwards most accurately understood and diligently inculcated upon the Athenians, on occasions very similar to the present, by Demosthenes, the greatest orator, and, perhaps, the greatest politician the world ever saw. He knew too well what it was to trust to the protection of an ambitious, faithless monarch. Those intimate connexions, says he, which republics form with tyrants are generally fatal to them. *

In the present crisis it would, perhaps, be dangerous for those states that are contiguous to France, and have suffered most from her power, to enter at once into an alliance against her. While we confine her within her shores, she would direct all her rage against them. Every blow we give her marine or commerce she would revenge upon them. She would pour in her immense armies and overwhelm them in an instant. No single, contiguous power is able to oppose her. A general combination is, perhaps, at present impossible. Fear, would restrain some, weakness, others. Germany is distracted and torn with mutual jealousies. Russia is the only power that can co-operate with us in such a manner as may most injure and humble France; and, at the same time, sustain little or no injury herself. The Emperor of Russia's dominions are extensive; his power formidable; his marine respectable; his distance from France so great, and the points of attack so few, that she never can make any impression upon him while awed and confined by our fleets. Two such powerful and formidable enemies as Great Britain and Russia, acting together with unanimity and effect, might not only obtain favourable and secure terms for themselves, but likewise emancipate the oppressed powers upon the Continent. Or, should France have the hardihood to oppose them both, she would soon have her commerce entirely ruined, her colonies wrested from her, and her territories threatened on all quarters. Should the Emperor of Russia pour in an army through Germany to attack her upon her frontiers, at the first reverse of fortune she would find herself deserted and threatened on all points. Then will be the time for the states of Germany to rise and attack her in the moment of dismay. Then will be the time for Holland to assert her independence, and revenge herself for all her oppressions. Then

* Ου γαρ ἀσφαλεις ταις πολιτειαις αι προς τυς τυραννους ἑταιριαι ὁμιλιαι. *Philip. Sept.*

will be the time for Switzerland to resume the bow and arrows of Tell, and steep their points in the blood of their tyrants. The more distant nations will catch the same spirit. That enthusiasm, which impelled Frenchmen upon the swords of their enemies, and rendered them intrepid and fearless, is gone. They have not even the mistaken but fascinating name of liberty to fight for. That enthusiasm, and that name will animate their enemies. They will begin to inquire for what purpose, and for whom they are again to be dragged from their homes, and driven in the face of their enemies. They will not raise against them the arms and vengeance of all Europe for the sake of a tyrant's ambition, who, should he succeed in baffling the designs of his enemies, will become only the more formidable and dangerous to his own people.

After having endeavoured to point out the necessity of maintaining the balance of power abroad, it follows next that we take a view of our own situation, and the circumstances which have forced us into the present war. The Treaty of Amiens, notwithstanding the encomiums bestowed upon it by the advocates of his Majesty's ministers, was certainly an unfortunate one for this country; unfortunate, because it left us stripped of many valuable possessions, for which we received no equivalent. It appears to have been made, if we may judge by the event, rather to gain a short breathing time, than as the foundation of a lasting and secure peace. The terms were not sufficiently explicit; the interest of this country and Europe not sufficiently attended to. If Buonaparté's conduct, since the signing of that treaty, has been villainous, that of our ministers has not been dignified and firm. They seemed always to think they were in the wrong. Their blundering politics needed perpetual corrections. Their views were always too limited; their language too tame; their policy too shallow and confined. And what has been the consequence? After repeated aggressions on the part of France, of patient submission and concession on our part; after orders were sent to give up the Cape; counter-orders to retain it; orders again to surrender it; and counter-orders, I suppose, would again have been sent to retain it, could they have reached it soon enough; it was not, until the most flagrant proofs of the ambitious views and hostile designs of the First Consul appeared, that his Majesty's ministers began to speak to him in the language which ministers of this country ought ever to use when it is insulted. Buonaparté certainly concluded from our patient endurance that we were afraid to involve ourselves in a quarrel with him. Robbery after robbery, and insult after insult, suffered to pass unnoticed or gently remonstrated against, would confirm the supposition. Our conduct smelled strongly of quietism. When struck on the one cheek we turned the other also. But the moment of aggression was the time to remonstrate. To oppose the designs of Buonaparté by secret negotiation and under-hand management, was merely to protract the distresses of this country and disgrace us in the eyes of Europe, without answering any purpose of policy, or prudence From beginning, to end it has been a series of complaints and negotiations, vainly endeavouring to patch up a faithless treaty by offers on the one hand as base as they were disgraceful, and by an extraordinary mixture of weakness and resolution, of concession and tenacity in the other. Courier after courier departed and returned. Messenger after messenger was hurried away or came post with some new project. For many a day was the sea vexed with their fruitless voyages. The people, in the meantime, left to gaze in idle wonder, and busy themselves in endless conjectures. The clouds at last began to gather and the storm to burst. But the causes for a rupture with France had existed ever since the signing of the Treaty of Amiens; nay, the First Consul was violating every article of it at the moment he signed the treaty. This requires a serious investigation. It deeply affects not only the honour of this country, but the conduct of his Majesty's ministers also. Let us examine it with candour and impartiality. I have already mentioned, that, at the conclusion of the last war we had acquired many advantages, while France had not made the least impression upon us. By the Treaty of Amiens we surrendered several West-India Islands to France and the Dutch, and made some sacrifices to Spain. In the East, the Cape was to be delivered up to Holland, and Pondicherry to the French. What then did France or her allies surrender to us as equivalents for the many valuable possessions we restored to them by the Treaty of Amiens? Nothing but the *declaration* of the independence of these our formerly well tried and most faithful allies! This indeed, had some appearance of attending to the balance of power upon the Continent. But how far was our influence to extend? To Holland, and Naples only. We were to rescue them from the pangs of French tyranny by so many and so great sacrifices,

when it was notorious to all, that France was retaining, and would retain them in perpetual subjection, so that they never could cultivate our friendship, though it should be ever so much their inclination. This, I affirm, was the basis of the Treaty of Amiens If ministers deny this; they must then confess that they made a peace upon the most humiliating terms, because the country could support the war no longer. This is the only other method by which they can pretend to justify themselves. But, on either supposition they have brought themselves into a dilemma. On either supposition, and I can think of no other, they have done essential injury to this country. Has Holland ever acquired her independence? Is the recent subjugation of Switzerland a proof of the First Consul's sincerity, or of our ministers attention to the interests of the Continent? Was the creation of states in Italy and other usurpations in that quarter consistent with the Treaty of Amiens? Is the language of Buonaparté that we have nothing to do with continental affairs agreeable to the spirit of that treaty? It goes directly in the face of it. Indeed, it appears from the whole of his conduct that Buonaparté never meant to fulfil the conditions of that treaty. He knew whom he had to deal with. He called loudly upon us to fulfil our part of the treaty, while he used the utmost expedition to occupy the surrendered colonies, and put himself in a capacity for renewing the war with better hopes of success Have we then gained any thing by the peace? Nothing but unanimity; nothing but compleat conviction, that, notwithstanding all our negotiations *, the First Consul has overreached our sapient ministers, and forced us, in an evil hour, into a new war. We hear much of the unanimity which the pacific measures of our ministers have produced in this country. But how have they produced it? By bringing us into dangers which must be unanimously opposed by every one who is not an enemy to his country. This is that boasted unanimity, which proceeds from necessity not choice. This is that unanimity which is our only consolation in disgrace, our only defence against ruin. I consider the magnanimity which this country displays in the present crisis, as not inferior to that of the Romans, when, after the battle of Cannæ, they unanimously went out to thank the Consul Varro, "because he had not "despaired of the republic," when he had, by his misconduct, nearly brought it to the brink of ruin.

Since then the Treaty of Amiens has been all along infringed, I ask, are we better prepared now than before it was signed to meet our enemy? An answer in the affirmative cannot be given. Trusting to the good faith of Buonaparté, (of which, from the whole tenor of his life, who could doubt?) we dismantled our ships, scattered our sailors, and disbanded our soldiers. Much time has been spent and great exertions made in equipping our fleets, which were, at the signing of the treaty, called in from the four quarters of heaven, while carrying terror and destruction against our enemies, to be laid up (how vain the expectation,) for a length of years, and their thunder to sleep harmless in their bosoms. In this country we seem to be wrapped in profound peace. Our preparations slow and tardy; nothing warlike is heard but the noisy rejoicings of a birth day, or the solitary drum to remind the garrison of the alternate hours of duty and repose. Are we then better prepared, and what have we gained by the Treaty of Amiens? What, but an armed truce and a more violent and dangerous war?

After negotiations have completely failed, we are now told of the insults which Buonaparté has offered to this country. Is this country indeed, fallen so low as to have suffered insults so long without assuming the aspect of revenge? When was it ever known before, that she submitted to any acts of aggression on the part of France? Our ancestors were jealous of the least indignity from that quarter. Injury, real or supposed, roused all their manly feelings, and anticipated, with terrible effect, the blow she meditated. But now, we are told that it was prudent to submit to be brow beaten, and threatened, and insulted. Why? Because we injured France, and detained her ships in our harbours? Because we required the First Consul to put a check upon the liberty of the French press!! Because we broke every article of a treaty sanctioned in the face of Europe for the interests of Europe? No; we did not show such spirit as the First Consul, and yet he insulted us. It was not over our weakness; for we had made him tremble. It was not over our honour; for the honour of the nation was un-

* I do not mean to say that our ministers were wrong in negotiating with Buonaparté. But their language ought to have been at once peremptory and decisive. If Buonaparté meant to fulfil the conditions of the treaty, he would have been obliged to have acted fairly and consistently. If he never meant to fulfil them, he would have been forced to declare himself and left no room to doubt of his perfidy.

stained *. It was over the pusillanimous conduct of ministry, who seemed to tremble at his frown. It was necessary to submit to indignity, hear it Britons, because the First Consul, flushed with victory, and new in tyranny, chose to lord it over this once gallant and formidable country. What? Must we submit to be brow-beaten and insulted by an infidel, by a barbarian, by an usurper, by a tyrant, a name ever detested by Britons? We are surely fallen low indeed, when we are brought to this. With arms in our hands, with an unconquerable spirit, with every thing dear and valuable before our eyes, yet it was thought prudent to submit. It was mean; it was disgraceful.

The detention of Malta is certainly an object of great importance in the present emergency. But I cannot agree with those politicians, who declare, that it is for Malta alone that we are engaged in the war. We are undoubtedly justified in retaining it in our possession, considering both the extinction of the Order to which it was to be given up under the guarantee of some independent power, and the unequivocal views of France upon it. We have already made too many sacrifices, while France has not made one. As she refused to fulfil her part of the treaty, we were justified in retaining it and much more, if it had been possible, in our power. While we retain it, we preserve the Ottoman Empire. It is of great importance to our commerce, and perhaps, to the safety of our East India possessions But it is extremely impolitic to hold out Malta alone as the object of dispute. It is a ready way to increase the jealousy of the maritime powers upon the Continent; already, it is said, alarmed at the strength of our navy, and the extension of our commerce which has swallowed up that of almost every other nation. What then? Will you gain a single ally if you tell the European states that you fight for Malta? Will you convince them that their interest is connected with your detention of Malta? Will they make a division upon the Continent in favour of this Empire, because we choose to risk its independence for the possession of Malta? Are the groans of Europe, still bleeding under her recent wounds, and still trembling under the frown of a despot, to be overlooked? Are the generous, but ill-fated sons of ancient heroes and freemen to be left unpitied, and unassisted under the galling yoke of slavery, while the far distant and barren rock of Malta interests so deeply our avaricious feelings? Are the injuries and insults we have received at home not to be taken into the account? You must convince Germany, Holland, Switzerland, and Russia, that their interest is connected with your own. You must make it a common cause against the robbers and plunderers of the human race. You must proclaim a crusade, and paint on its banners, "*The conservation of Liberty, "Religion, and Laws.*" I see a great and magnanimous spirit in this country that rises against the least infringement of its rights, and is delicately sensible of the smallest injury done to its honour. I see a proud superiority over every other nation under Heaven, with regard to its religion, laws, and government. I see that just indignation which the unprincipled and mad ambition of a despot raises in every breast, prompting to wise and patriotic measures; to a cheerful submission to great sacrifices, and rousing all the firm and determined resolution of Britons. We want neither fleets nor armies to maintain the contest. We want not spirit nor unanimity to vindicate our rights. We have not forgot the ancient bravery of our fathers. The British thunder is carried, with irresistible effect, as far as the seas extend, and the winds can blow. Our swords are scarce wiped from the blood of our enemies. We have still before our eyes the victories of Howe, and St. Vincent, and Duncan, and Nelson. We stretch our view to the glorious plains of Egypt, and to the waters of the Nile, still red with the blood of the French. And we anticipate equal if not more splendid victories. But we want a pilot to direct the reeling state in this impending storm. We want the firm integrity; the deep penetration; the extensive views; the commanding eloquence; the unbending soul of one able to steer this country through storms which have wrecked the noblest states of Europe. Place such a man at the head of affairs and we shall be secure. We will safely repose upon his vigilance and discretion.—We will not be slaves. The enemy may invade us.

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* Ἐν δέ τι κοινον, says Demosthenes, ἡ φυσις των ἐυ φρονυντων ἐν ἑαυτη κεκτηται φυλακτηριον· ὁ πασι μεν ἐστιν ἀγαθον και σωτηριον, μαλιστα δε τοις πληθεσι προς τας τυραννους. τι ὀν ἐστι τουτο; ἀπιστια. ταυτην φυλαττετε· ταυτης ἀντεχεσθε. ἐαν ταυτην σωζητε, ὀυδεν δεινον μηπαθητε. *Phil. Sept.* A wise politician possesses in himself a defence that reaches to all. But it is useful and salutary, particularly to free states against the ambition of Kings. And what is this defence? Distrust. Maintain it; keep it always in view; if you preserve it, you shall have nothing to fear.

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——— "Let them come,
They come like sacrifices in their trim,
And to the fire eyed maid of smoky war,
All hot and bleeding will we offer them:
The mailed Mars shall on his altar sit
Up to the ears in blood."———

Let them come; and if ever they reach land, which, with the First Consul himself, I think scarce possible, we shall soon hear of this melancholy epistle being sent to Buonaparté the Consul: "The groans of the French: The English on the one hand chase us into the sea; the sea on the other chases us back upon the English, and we have only the hard choice left us of perishing by the sword or by the waves."

Edinburgh, 21st June, 1803.

PUBLIC PAPERS.

Note presented by Gandolphe, Chargé d'Affaires of the French Republic, to the Landamman of the Helvetian Republic. Dated, Berne, June 3, 1803.

The Undersigned Chargé d'Affaires of the French Republic, has received orders from his Government to make known to that of Helvetia, the new provocations of England, its hostilities, and the motives of defence, and honour, which have directed the conduct of the French Government. The Treaty of Amiens was scarcely signed, when the English Government already meditated a breach of it. The conduct which it has adopted since that epoch, clearly announces that intention. It suffered the French Government to be daily insulted by its periodical Writers and by Pamphlets, the Authors of which, for the greater part Foreigners, were consequently in the power of Government. It continued to give an asylum and protection to dangerous Men pointed out by the French Government. Some were hostilely assembled at Jersey, whilst others were vomited on our Coasts by the English themselves, without the Ministry doing any thing else than evading the complaints which were made to it upon that occasion. As much as good faith and a desire of executing quickly the Treaty of Amiens was displayed on the part of France, so much the more was craft and delay exhibited on the part of England. Ten months passed away without its being perceived that the English Government had the least disposition to evacuate the Island of Malta, which, according to the terms of the Treaty, was to have been at the end of three months. This Clause was too important for the French Government to neglect requiring its execution; it was then that instead of that, came the Message by which the KING announced to Parliament, that formidable Armaments were preparing in the Ports of France and Holland, and that there existed between the two Governments important Discussions, of which the result was uncertain. All Europe knew the object of these Armaments, and as to the pretended Discussions, they were evidently imaginary, since the French Government had no knowledge of them. It was necessary to demand an explanation with respect to these false assertions, and it did it with that calmness and dignity which was congenial with reason. The English Ministry, on the contrary, was as arrogant in its style as unjust in its pretensions. Such is the constant difference which it is easy to remark in the respective Notes transmitted in the course of that discussion, in which one does not know at which to be more astonished, at the indecent demands of the English Government, or at the patient moderation of the First Consul. The issue of such a Negotiation it was easy to foresee.—The English Government published, on the 16th of May, a Declaration of War. HIS BRITANNIC MAJESTY forbid his Subjets from entering the Dutch and French Ports, or those which were occupied by French Troops. He ordered an Embargo upon the Vessels belonging to those two powers, that were in his Ports, and upon the Persons and Merchandize that were on board those Vessels. They authorized the fitting out of Privateers against all Ships belonging to Frenchmen, or Inhabitants of France; and even before any Declaration of War, two English Frigates took possession of two French Merchantmen at a little distance from Brest. The Government, disappointed in its expectation of maintaining the general Peace, was bound to adopt such measures as the dignity and the interests of the Republic required. It published all the official papers respecting the Negotiation with England, from the first overtures which led to the signature of the Preliminaries to the period at which England refused to comply with her engagements; and being forced to refer the decision of such great interests to the decision of Arms, the French Government wishes, by a frank explanation of its conduct, to answer the pretexts upon which England justifies its aggression.—The Helvetic Government will without doubt see in the Communication which is thus made to it, a new proof of the desire of the French Government to preserve those relations of Amity which have so long united France and Switzerland. The Undersigned eagerly seizes this opportunity of assuring the Landamman of Switzerland of his respectful consideration.

GANDOLPHE.

Proclamation of Maria Louisa Infanta of Spain, Regent of the Kingdom of Etruria. Dated Florence, May 27, 1803.

His Majesty the King, our exalted Consort, having, after a short and incurable illness, to our deep regret, and the extreme grief of his loving subjects, passed to eternal rest, the Sovereignty of the States of the deceased Monarch, with all rights appertaining to the same, devolves, by the legal order of succession, and the testamentary regulation of the late King, to his son, the Infant of Spain, Charles Louis, now King of Etruria, and the administration of those States, till the royal successor shall attain the age of eighteen, is by the same regulation vested in us. We, therefore, having taken upon us this important office, it is our wish and resolution to discharge our trust suitable to the confidence reposed in us by our late Royal Consort; and we hereby confirm the present Constitution and Laws of the country, and continue in their Offices all Magistrates, &c. All regulations of Government and Finance will be decreed, and issued by us, with the concurrence of our Privy Council.—Given at Florence the 27th of May, 1803. (Signed) *Maria Louisa. F. G. Mozzi. G. B. Nuti.*

Communication made to the City of Bremen by Gen. Mortier, Commander of the French Army.—French Republic, Head-Quarters at Nienbourgh, June 4, year 11.

To the Senate of Bremen. — The English Government, Gentlemen, having seized French Vessels without any declaration of War, the French Government orders that reprisals be made with respect to ships belonging to the subjects of Great Britain. I request you, therefore, on the receipt of this letter, to confiscate, for the French Republic, all English vessels and Magazines, and to arrest all Officers and Sailors in the service of Great-Britain, who happen to be in your city. —I rely, Gentlemen, on your readiness to conform to the intentions of my Government.—I have the honour to salute you.—*Edward Mortier.*

FOREIGN.

Naples, June 12.—The Commandant of the British Naval Force in the Mediterranean, has declared, that if the French occupy the Kingdom of Naples and the Roman States, he will treat those countries with hostility

Cuxhaven, June 16.—This place is now in possession of the French troops. A few days before their arrival, the English carried on a very heavy press among the sailors.

Frankfort, June 16.—The Deputies from the Hanoverian Regency, passed through here this day. They had an audience of his Prussian Majesty last evening at Wilhelmsbade.

Dunkirk, June 20.—Gen. Dicres, Minister of Marine, arrived here this day, on his route along the coast. An hundred and fifty of the Consular Guards have been here two days.

Paris, June 28.—Cherbourg, St. Locentances, and Bayonne have resolved to construct a number of flat-bottomed boats at their own expense. The department of the Seine and Oise has voted 800,000 francs, that of the Channel 750,000, and that of the Isere 50,000, for the construction and armament of ships of war.—The following modifications have taken place in the decree for the imprisonment of the English:—1. The Artists and Artizans, employed in French manufactories, shall not be obliged to quit the Commune where those establishments are situated, if the principals claim them, and engage to answer for them. 2. Such Englishmen as have established manufactories or commercial houses in rural Communes, or small towns, in which there is no Military Commandant or Officer of Gensdarmerie, may, after submitting themselves to the Officers of the nearest City, return to their manufactories or commercial houses. 3. Those Englishmen who, since the peace, and before the declaration of war, manifested an intention of establishing themselves in France, and of becoming French Citizens, and who have complied with the formalities requisite for that purpose, are not comprised in the dispositions of the Decree.——Buonaparté, after having left Paris, proceeded on his route through Compeigne, Montidier, Amiens, Boulogne, Calais, Dunkirk, Nieuport, and Ostend. He was every where received with the most joyful acclamations. Addresses and congratulations were presented both to him and Mad. Buonaparté by Bishops, Priests, Prefects, Commissaries, and every other description of public persons. His time was employed in examining the various works in the different places through which he passed.

DOMESTIC.

From the London Gazette.—*Whitehall, June* 28.—The King has been pleased to constitute and appoint Sir Rupert George, Knight, Ambrose Serle, and Thomas Hamilton, Esquires, the Hon. Edward Bouverie, and James Bowen, Esq. to be his Majesty's Commissioners for conducting the Transport Service, and for the care and custody of Prisoners of War.——*Crown-Office, July* 2.—Member returned to serve in the present Parliament.—Borough of Southwark.—The Right Hon. George Tierney.

London, July 2.—Mr. Tierney's election was celebrated this day, by himself and his friends in the Borough, by a numerous procession and a great feast.—4th. Upwards of 100 men, who had been impressed by the different parties of patrole, were examined this morning at Bow Street, when about 70 of them appearing to be idle and disorderly, and being deemed fit for his Majesty's service were sent on board a tender.—6th. Upwards of 40 more were examined this morning, and the greatest part detained for the service.—It is stated that 23,000 volunteers are actually embodied in Scotland, exclusive of cavalry, of which there is a regiment at Edinburgh, and many disciplined troops in various parts of the country. Several offers of service have been made by different military bodies in Scotland.—In consequence of a summons from the Lord Lieutenant, a meeting of the Deputy Lieutenants and Magistrates of Kent was held, and a plan adopted for the defence of that county in case of an invasion.

MILITARY.

Gen. Mortier, with his army, still continues on the left bank of the Rhine, and it is said, will not, for the present, pass the frontiers of the electorate of Hanover. —Gen. Dessolles is carrying on the most vigorous organization of the army of reserve, of which he is to have the command. It is to be assembled at *Deventer*, whither French and Batavian troops are daily marching from all directions. The second battalion of the regiment of Saxe-Gotha passed through Utrecht on the 23d ult. on its way from Schoonhorn: the second squadron of Batavian dragoons which was on its march for Harlem, received orders on the 22d to return: the first battalion of the 6th Batavian demi-brigade is on its way from Leyden; and the first battalion of the 5th demi-brigade, which was on its march for Hardwicke, received counter-orders on the 22d, and was on its return for Deventer. The body of 4000 Batavian troops, which is to form a part of this army, will, it is supposed, provisionally occupy a camp in *Overyssel.* It is said, that the army will not remain in the Batavian territories, but will establish their head-quarters at *Osnaburg*, which is at present garrisoned by 1600 French infantry and 400 hussars, under the command of Gen. Drouet.

Gen. St. Cyr, counsellor of state, who commands the French and Italian army of

reserve, forming in Italy, arrived on the 9th inst. at *Rimini*, whence he is going to *Ancona*. The second division of this army, which consists of Italian troops, under the command of GEN. LECCHI, and the second Helvetic demi-brigade, which was assembled in *Romagna*, has followed the first, and has entered the Roman states. Another division, destined to occupy *Capua*, is on its march for Tuscany. The Italian republic, having no marine, and being therefore unable to assist the French by maritime operations, will make great augmentations of its troops, which will be succesively sent and united with the Gallo-Italian army. All the ships of the Ligurian republic are to be equipped and placed at the disposal of the French government.

NAVAL.

June 24th.—The *Doris* captured the French privateer *La Pelagie*, of 4 guns and 37 men, from Nantes, on a cruise.—*25th.*—*Capt. Mundy* in the *Hyara*, captured *La Phœbe* French privateer, of 4 guns and 2 swivels, three days from Cherbourg.—*27th.*—*Lieutenants Temple and Bowen*, of His Majesty's ship *Loire*, with three boats, boarded and carried, after a severe conflict of nearly ten minutes on the deck, the French national brig *Venteux*, of 4 long 18-pounders and 6 36-pound brass carronades, and 82 men. The action was confined to two boats, as the third, from rowing heavy, did not get up till the brig was taken possession of. The brig laid close under the batteries of the Isle of Bas, from which a heavy firing was kept up during the whole engagement. On board the boats, the boatswain, 4 seamen and a marine were wounded; and on board the brig the second captain and 2 seamen were killed, and the captain, 4 officers and 8 seamen wounded.

SUMMARY OF POLITICS.

THE BLOCKADE OF THE ELBE, of which we have already expressed our hearty approbation, as being well calculated to convince some of those powers, who from fear or covetousness, now give the command of their territories to France, that such baseness will not save them from ruin. The measure is, too, perfectly justified by every law and principle of war. Hamburgh, and persons trading to Hamburgh and other places on the Elbe, have no right to complain; for, while the French command that river, while they there exercise hostility against us, we have most assuredly a right to shut them up, to prevent them from sailing out against our ships and our country, and also to prevent them from receiving succours of any and of every kind; and, if the Hamburghers tell us, that it is *the Elbe only* which the French occupy, and not their city or its port, our answer is, that it is *the Elbe only which we blockade*, leaving the port and city of Hamburgh, together with every other port and place upon the river, to enjoy every right of neutrality, agreeably to the spirit and the letter of the Public Law of Europe. Troops of one of the belligerent powers may *pass through* a neutral territory, without subjecting the neutral power to any acts of hostility from the opposite belligerent power; but they cannot *take possession* of, they cannot *occupy*, they cannot *encamp* or *quarter* themselves in such neutral territory, without exposing the neutral power to all the inconveniences of war. — While this measure is, however, so well supported, both by the rights and interests of the nation, some of the merchants make it an object of bitter complaint. It is, say they, effecting as much mischief as our enemies can desire, and more than they were able, or expected, to do us themselves. Our export trade has stood still these four months; we now blockade the Elbe, and the instant effect of that measure is, information from the London Houses, that they will not "*honour* bills" for their most respectable correspondents in the Baltic, and so the orders for the Baltic are stopped, and the sale of our goods there is ruined. They further urge, that, as to goods which are wanted, reaching the markets of the continent, in as great quantities and upon as good terms as we wish them, that is a mistake; for, that a smuggling trade, which must be paid for in ready money, is always a retail trade; and the credit must be immense to supply a continent, frozen four or five months in the year, and supplied as it hitherto has been by us, by shipment, of a six-months' winter-stock, made befors the frost sets in. If any persons now make these shipments, how will they be paid? Where is now to be the seat of exchange? whither can it be removed? and where will confidence be found or given by commercial men, placed between two fires, the enemies and our own? These are the arguments which merchants use against the blockade of the Elbe; but, though we cannot refrain from expressing, with them, our astonishment at the genius, which dictated the abandonment of Hanover to the French, without a struggle, and then called upon the

Danes and Prussians, under penalty of losing their commerce, to expel those French from the banks of the Elbe, and to clear that river for the English; though we participate with them and with the world in condemning the unaccountable tardiness and neglect of ministers with regard to Hanover, we can by no means agree with the merchants in condemning the only step, by which a mitigation of that fatal neglect could possibly be obtained. — Did we, indeed, consider the sale of English goods to the Northern nations as the principal object, which ministers ought, in this case, to have in view, we should assent to the reasoning of the merchants; but we are very far indeed from entertaining such an opinion; we shall, for the sake of defending and avenging our country, be very ready to part with a portion of our trade; "*perish commerce; live the constitution!*" words with which Mr. Windham was charged, without ever having uttered them; words which were long one of the favourite topics of factious discontent. These words are now echoed from one end of the country to the other, and the sentiment they express is, we believe, almost universally adopted. The latter part, "*live the constitution,*" was, indeed, carefully omitted by the patriots of 1796, as, in another case, was all the context of the words "*a vigour beyond the law,*" which were made use of as part of a declaration opposed to another of Messrs. Fox and Sheridan, who, in behalf of Thelwall and others of that description, recommended a defiance of the law; in reply to which Mr. Windham said, that he trusted the law would be strong enough to enforce the execution of its own provisions; but, if it was set at defiance, he hoped government would have a vigour beyond it. Nevertheless, the detached phrases were, in these instances, taken up, and circulated through the nation with all the malignant industry of which republicans and traitors are capable; and the ignorant, of every rank, soon adopted the belief, that Mr. Windham had expressed his wish that *all commerce might perish*, and that government would, *at all times exercise a vigour beyond the law*, or, in other words, change the constitution of England into a despotism like that of Algiers.—These expressions, however, these offensive expressions, have, by the necessities growing out of the Treaty of Amiens, been, of late, brought into a pretty decent train of *practical* elucidation, and (strange to relate!) without creating the least alarm, or clamour, in favour either of Billingsgate or the Old Bailey; insomuch that "*perish commerce*" and "*vigour beyond the law,*" now stalk forth in all their naked deformity and loathsomeness, without exciting the least indignation or disgust, either at St. Stephen's or in the newspaper offices. Blessed change! There is nothing like filling people with serious dread of invasion now and then, which has, in politics, an effect similar to that which a dangerous fit of sickness has in morals. Away go all the fooleries of liberty and equality, all the licentious ravings against press-gangs and standing armies, all the empty talk about whiggism and "the constitution as "established at the revolution"; away go all these pomps and vanities, and the trembling sinner gladly renounces them for ever, if he can, but for this time, escape with his life.

FRENCH BISHOPS AND EMIGRANTS.—In our last, we referred to the slanderous imputations, which had been thrown out against the French bishops indiscriminately, who, during the late war, took shelter, and were protected and provided for in England. The Morning Post and Oracle, and, indeed, almost all the London newspapers, had stated, that "those very bishops, who "had been FED by us, were now praying for the success of the French against "England." Another ground of complaint was, that these bishops were praying "for an usurper, though they had formerly "taken the oath of fidelity to their lawful "king."—First, we are struck with the *consistency* of these editors, who reproved all the French emigrants, without distinction, that were guilty of what they termed "*obstinately* rejecting the amnesty offered "by the republican government," and who now censure those emigrants for acts which necessarily arise out of their acceptance of the amnesty, unless these editors expected of them to return to France for the sole purpose of starving, or of being executed as traitors. Secondly, we cannot help admiring the *loyalty* of those men, who were for ten years clamouring against every one that appeared to harbour a thought hostile to the *legitimacy* of the usurped government of France; those men, who justified the expulsion of the king, who applauded the rebellion of his subjects; those men who have, from time to time, called on His Majesty to make peace, to acknowledge as the lawful sovereign of France, all those men who have at any time been at the head of the rebellion, and who had all taken an oath of fidelity to their king; those men who have poured out such tor-

rents of abuse on Lord Grenville for advising the letter which rejected the overtures of Buonaparté; those men, who never were easy, till they, at last, found fit materials to work on, till their clamours induced the present ministers to make peace with, and thereby solemnly to acknowledge the legality of the power of the Corsican Consul; those men who have, during fifteen years, been exerting themselves, in every possible way, to enfeeble and to break in sunder the bonds of allegiance, who have treated with contempt all the ties between subject and sovereign, and who have, in a more especial manner, reprobated every attempt to restore the king of France to the throne of his ancestors and to that sway over his people, which such a restoration must necessarily give him; these men it is, who have now the effrontery to rail against the French bishops, because they pray for an "*usurper*," after having once taken an oath of fidelity "to "their *lawful king*;" that usurper whose authority these men have so often held to be lawful, that king whose person and whose family they have so often libelled, and whose claims of sovereignty they have constantly treated with scorn! Thirdly, the notions of *gratitude*, which these gentlemen seem to entertain, are very well worthy of remark. But, here we must, however unwillingly, listen for a moment to the True Briton of the 6th instant. "We long ago stated from undoubted in- "formation, that the French emigrants "who had been for years *fostered* in this "country, and *fed by its benevolence*, had "given in innumerable plans to the chief "Consul, upon their return to France, for "the invasion of our island: we have no "doubt, should an invasion be attempted, "of seeing many of these infamous fellows "amongst our invaders. Should such be "the case, we would have them all *hanged* "*upon gibbets mast-high*, as memorials of "*French gratitude* and *English folly*."—So! it was English *folly* was it, which "fed" the French emigrants? What did England expect, then, by the allowance that was made them, and on which it is well known to government that hundreds of them *literally starved to death*? Did she "*feed*" them (for *feed* it must be, it seems) for her own purposes, or for theirs? Did she give them food from motives somewhat similar to those, with which a farmer's wife crams her turkeys; or did she feed them upon the pure and disinterested principles of charity? Did she consider them as persons whose lives, if preserved, might become valuable to herself; or did she regard them merely as strangers in distress? If the former, where is her pretension to *benevolence*; and, if the latter, where is the *ground of her complaint*? If the food which we gave the emigrants was, by us, regarded as the means of purchasing their neutrality, with respect to Britain, for the rest of their lives, our claim on their gratitude ceases of course; and, if no such compact was understood, even by ourselves, whence comes our right to select them in particular, out of an invading French army, for the purpose of "*hanging them upon gibbets, mast* "*high*?" Besides, where is this claim on French gratitude to end? It will certainly embrace those Frenchmen *now here*, as well as those who have been here; and then, let the adherents of MONSIEUR beware; for, according to the London news-printers, they must, in case their sovereign should be restored to his throne, never draw a sword for him, in any war that he may happen to have with this country, lest, if they should be taken prisoners, they should swing upon "a gibbet mast high!" So base, so detestable an idea, never was, for one moment, entertained by any human being, the London news-printers excepted! As to the facts, however, from which these notions have arisen, they are as false, as the notions are grovelling and savage. There have been, during the revolution, 3 French archbishops and 16 bishops residing in England, to wit, archbishops of Narbonne, Aix, Bordeaux; bishops of Arras, Montpellier, Noyon, Perigueux, Troyes, Leon, Avranches, Varrens, Uzei, Rodez, Nantes, Lescar, Angoulême, Lombez, Cominges, Moulins. Of these, *five* only have submitted to the new order of things, and returned to France, to wit, archbishops of Aix and Bordeaux, and the bishops of Cominges, Troyes, and Lescar, the last of whom is since dead. So that, out of *nineteen*, only *five* have returned to France, and *four* only now found amongst those who are praying for the success of Buonaparté. This explanation proves, that it is *malignity against those Emigrants who remain here*, and not anger against those who have returned, by which the London news-printers are actuated. They say to the public: "this is the recompense you "will receive for *feeding* these Frenchmen." And, indeed, it is no very unintelligible hint for the mob to commit acts of violence on them. If this base hint should be taken, we trust, however, that such violence will not be committed with impunity.—Again: on the subject of *gratitude* from the French

Emigrants to this country, it is, it seems, due for *protection* as well as for food; now, be it known, to the eternal shame and disgrace of the London press, that it was no longer ago than the month of September last, that these very news-printers were unanimous in recommending, that the Vendéan Royalists, men who had long fought against Buonaparté, in alliance with Great-Britain, should not only be deprived of protection, should not only be sent out of the country, but should be *given up to Buonaparté*, to that very man, against whom they had fought for us, that very man whom these news-printers now represent as an "inexorable tyrant," a "barbarous mon-"ster," but to whom they then wished the Royalists to be surrendered as a means of preserving peace! and these, good heavens! these are the men, who propose to hang French Royalists upon "gib-"bets mast high," because they are not sufficiently grateful for the *protection* they have received in this country!

THE THREATS OF BUONAPARTÉ surpass those of the Convention and the Directory; they are more insolent than those of Barras, more bloody than those of Robespierre. This is the man, in whom Lord Hawkesbury had the sagacity to perceive, "every mark of sincere friendship" towards England; this is the man, for *doubting* the sincerity of whose friendship Mr. Elliot was severely reproached, if not abused and bullied, by the late Attorney General.—The toasts, drunk at Calais, on the 29th ult. at a public dinner, given by Commissary Mengaud to the new Prefect, breathe the spirit of those who gave them: *The Commandant of the Troops*, "To him who "shall first distribute the billets for lodging "the troops at Dover."—*The Colonel of the 28th of the Line*, "The first review of the "French troops in St. James's Park."—*The Commissary at War*, "Plenty of all in "England, and may John Bull make suit-"able preparation for the republican army, "to shew the zeal and talents of the com-"missaries at war."—*The Consul of the United States*, "The union of the two countries, "whence have sprung the hopes of the "return of the human species to liberty. "May the properly extended efforts of the "chiefs of the two governments disappoint "every scheme of usurpation and mono-"poly." But, neither these toasts nor the placards that are stuck up in the towns and villages in France, holding England out as an object of plunder, and threatening its inhabitants with death, in case of resistance; none of these ought to be complained of, none of them can be called *insolent*, towards those who made, who supported, or who approved of the peace of Amiens. That peace was made upon the base principle of acknowledged inferiority; upon the principle that any thing is better than war; that war is an evil at all times, and under all circumstances, and that to avoid it, no disgrace is too great. Upon this principle it was that the honour of the flag was given up, that Portugal, Sardinia, the Stadtholder, and the Vendéan Royalists, were abandoned, in defiance of the most solemn engagements. Those who had no feeling on this account, who were callous as iron to all these acts of perfidy and cruelty, who slandered, and who, if their cowardice had not been greater than their malignity, would have murdered the few persons, who opposed and reprobated the infamous peace; these people are now crying out against Buonaparté! They have now discovered, that he is "the "most abominable miscreant that ever "breathed!" And for what? What has he done now more than he had done before the Treaty of Amiens? The murders of Toulon, Paris, Pavia, Alexandria, and Jaffa, were all committed before; and our acknowledgement of the legitimacy of his authority could not, certainly, make him more "a rebel and usurper" than he was previous to that acknowledgement. Yet, behold, those very persons, who applauded the peace made with him, who paid him compliments the most fulsome, who even praised his government, are now exhausting on him the whole vocabulary of abuse; and, rebel, usurper, traitor, tyrant, murderer, and monster, are applied to him with as little ceremony as if Mr. Peltier had not, within these five months, been tried and *convicted*, before a British court and jury, for "devising and intend-"ing to traduce, defame and vilify the "said Napoleon Buonaparté!"—And, do we believe, that the world is too stupid to perceive this? Is there any one foolish enough to hope, that our baseness will escape the observation and contempt of the rest of mankind?

THE FUNDS have, during the last week, experienced great fluctuation. They have risen a little from the state in which they were some days ago, in consequence, it is said, of the minister's having determined, at the instance of the Bank Directors, to abandon his project of a tax collected at the Bank. It appears, that these gentlemen did not like to be put upon a level with excisemen, or rather, indeed, with tything men,

seeing that the tax was to be taken in kind. The fact is, they perceived, that this tax, so collected, must be regarded as neither more nor less than a payment of nineteen shillings in the pound, which, together with the hard-heartedness of Parliament in *restraining* them from paying their notes in specie, would, they foresaw, strongly tend to reduce the paper of their manufactory to a value somewhat beneath that of its parent rags.——While most men of any reflection are perceiving, and trembling at, the fatal influence of the funds upon political measures, and events, Mr. George Rose seems to rejoice at the increase of that influence, and, with apparent exultation, informs the Parliament, that *fifty-thousand* men, belonging to Friendly Societies, are now participating in the feelings created by the said influence: " in fact," says he, " they are " *stockholders*." Stockholders, indeed! They belong to clubs, each of which, by collecting a shilling a month, or something thereabouts, from each man, at last gets a sum, which is laid out in stock; so that each of these labourers and journeymen, whose portion of the aggregate sum does not amount, perhaps, to more than ten shillings, conceits himself a proprietor in the funds; and thus, if Mr. Rose's statement be correct, there are, by this scheme of Friendly Societies, no less than 50,000 labourers and journeymen turned into speculators and calculators of per cents; fifty-thousand of the men, who ought to fight the battles of their country, are, by this blessed plan, made to hate the very sound of war, to wish for peace, at all times, and upon any terms. Out of these clubs have grown others for the purpose of finding substitutes to serve in the militia in room of any of the members, who may happen to be drawn; a sort of mutual insurance companies, where men are sheltered from the service of their country as property is protected from accidents by fire! The truth is, that the whole nation is fast becoming a fraternity of clubs, all operating in the most mischievous way, and all arising out of the parent club in Thread-Needle-Street.——We are, however, happy to perceive, that the dangers of the country, which have awakened men's attention to things before overlooked, have given rise to the utterance of some very correct and manly sentiments on this subject, and others closely connected with it. Lord Darnley observed, in the debate of the 5th instant, that, " were all the *Jew-brokers become* " *bankrupts*, and all the *three-per-cent mon-* " *gers no more*, there would still be the " *country* to fight for." This is the sort of language that becomes every man, particularly a nobleman. The funding system is eating out the heart of the nobility; it is stifling every high and honourable feeling; it is now engaged in a desperate contest against the aristocracy and monarchy of England, and this contest must finally, and, perhaps, at no very distant period, terminate in the destruction of one or the other.

DEFENCE OF THE COUNTRY.—On the subject of the Conscript Bill, we beg leave to refer our Readers to the letters of INQUISITOR, p. 51, which have been sent us from the country, and which appear to have been written by a person, who has narrowly watched the progress of the bill. We cannot, however, refrain from pointing out to our Readers the shameful remisness of the ministers as to military concerns. On the 7th of March they inform the Parliament, that there are preparations, on the coasts of France and Holland, which render it necessary to take measures to meet an invasion. A few days later they actually call out the militia, which is tantamount to a declaration that *imminent danger of invasion* exists; and, it has now transpired, in a very late debate on the subject of defence, that, only *two* months ago, they were asking military men, and Colonel Crawfurd amongst the rest, for *plans of defence*; so that, they suffered two whole months to elapse, after they thought there was imminent danger of invasion, without coming to any resolution as to the way of resisting that invasion! Then, again, as to the Conscript Bill, they now say, that, what has been *finally determined on* was their original plan; that it was even so *presented to his Majesty*; but that, the military men differing in opinion upon the subject, the plan was laid aside, and the bill brought in with all the imperfections, which were removed by the opposition of Mr. Windham, Mr. Elliot, and Dr. Laurence. Colonel Crawfurd did, indeed, add his great weight to this opposition, but he did not speak on the subject, 'till after the Secretary at War had signified his intention to introduce all the good provisions which the bill now contains: so that, if the ministerial statement be true, a plan, which had first been proposed by the ministers to the King, and which had afterwards been abandoned in consequence of the disagreement amongst the great military authorities, was finally adopted through the remonstrances of two country gentlemen and a lawyer, who never had before heard of it, and who had to encounter the opposition of the Pittites, the Foxites, and the stronger and more immoveable phalanx

of the ministers! This may be true, and, if it be, what praise is not due to the trio, who performed this wonderful achievement! But, as we said before, when people see the enemy at their doors, fear gets the better of every other feeling; and, as we long ago stated, the Parliament and the nation will, as their dangers increase, listen with more and more attention to those noblemen and gentlemen, who opposed the destructive treaty, from the signing of which we have dated all our present calamities.——On the subject of defence we cannot refrain from noticing a speech, which has, by the Morning Chronicle of the 5th instant, been attributed to the Militia Colonel, Bastard, but of which, we hope no part was ever uttered by that gentleman. It was as follows:—"He hoped, that the British Militia would "not learn the whole Austrian discipline. "There was a part of that discipline which "neither the officers of the British Militia "nor the men understood, and he hoped "they would never understand it, *that was* "*to retreat*. He hoped, as had been said "already, that while an hundred English "Militia men were together, they would "never retreat one inch; they might ad- "vance at command, *but never retreat*— "many of us might fall, but *if* this was our "determination, we must be at last success- "ful, we wanted no instructions to dispose "of our courage any way, but to exert it.— "Austrians might *retreat*, Austrians might "be *defeated*, Austrians might be *disgraced*, "but the English *must* do neither, *must* "fight until they defeat their enemy, they "*must* fight while a man remains of them "to be opposed to a foe."——Now, we repeat, that this "*must*" be a gross misrepresentation of what the member said, if not altogether a fabrication; for, it is absolutely impossible, that this gentleman, who, a very little while ago, expressed his confident hopes, that we should have "the *assistance* of *strong* and *powerful allies*, on the Continent of Europe, could have given way to such vain boasting as this at the expense of the bravest ally that this country ever had, especially when he recollects, that, in the glorious victory, which decided the fate of Egypt, the Queen's *German* regiment bore a most conspicuous and honourable part, and that, it was to that regiment, composed chiefly of Austrians, Hungarians, and Transylvanians, that we owed the death of general Roiz and *the capture of the Invincible Standard*. No; the honourable gentleman must have remembered all this, and, so remembering, it is absolutely incredible that he should have held up the Imperial armies as *run-aways*.——On the proceedings of the able recruiting-officers at Bow-Street, we have not, at present, time to give our opinion at any length; but we cannot help observing, that, if the persons they apprehend, are, as the news-printers say they are, "*pickpockets and vagabonds*," we are very sorry to see such persons sent either to the army or the fleet; and, if the persons taken up do *not* properly come under the *vagrant act*, the other horn of the dilemma becomes dreadfully formidable. For the chearful acquiesence of those zealous lovers of liberty, the printers of news-papers, we were at a loss to account, 'till, in their journals of yesterday, we perceived, that they had been informed of Buonaparté's having obtained a list of their names, with the intention, in case of his conquering this country, to "*send them all to Cayenne or Madagascar*," rather than which they would, we presume, view, with profound silence, the impressment of every man in the kingdom, down to their very nearest of kin. This, then, is the pure source of their loyalty and zeal, at the present moment! We shall now hear no more clamour against "*gag*-bills;" no more pathetic harangues about the *Habeas Corpus Act* and the "*Bastille*;" Governor ARIS may now hope to live without being the daily subject of five hundred falsehoods and half as many libels; "*perish commerce*," and "*a vigour beyond the law*," will be standing toasts at all their typographical meetings, where even that dear object of their adoration, the *liberty of the press*, will be overlooked, and, if their fright should continue, soon be forgotten.——Their *motives*, however, are not of so much consequence as their conduct: most of them are, except as to the French emigrants, behaving very well. They give publicity to many excellent and animating essays, which, we trust, will have a beneficial and lasting effect.

FUNDS.

FRENCH. ..... *June*	25	27	28	29	30
5 pr Ct. Con.	49 80	49 75	49 85	49 50	50 35

ENGLISH. .. *July*	1	2	4	5	6	7
3 per Ct. Red.	54⅛	53	52⅛	51¼	52	54
Omnium. *Dis.*	4¼	5½	7	7¾	6	5¼

BREAD, 9½ the Quartern Loaf.

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The following excellent article is concluded from Vol. III. p. 897, we regret it was not in our power to insert it sooner; but, it is now, by no means, too late.

Bad, however, as things may be, yet, under the present circumstances, I do not think it possible for France, rash and enterprizing as her chief magistrate unquestionably is, to invade any part of our empire, from the mouth of the British Channel to the German Ocean. Of the perfect safety of Ireland I will not be so positive, unless a considerable squadron be stationed there, however confident I may be in its security, so long as our Channel fleet is consigned to the care and command of the unrivalled officer who now conducts it. The great Cornwallis is ever vigilant and active: his soul is in his profession, and he is wholly devoted to the service of his King and Country, and to maintain the proud pre-eminence of our marine. He has no political intrigue in contemplation, no favourite rendezvous at any of our anchorages, but is himself constantly at his station before the mouth of our enemy's port, without ever delegating his authority to another. You will therefore, I am sure, join with me in saying, that if the admiralty have no other mind, they certainly have evinced a discretion in the choice of this illustrious commander, which so far entitles them to the thanks of the country. The many distinguished traits, in the professional character of Admiral Cornwallis, are so fresh in the mind of every man at all conversant with the naval history of this country, during the last and American war, that I shall not at present enter into a detail of them, though I think it right just to call your attention to his ten months close blockade of Brest, on his succeeding Earl St. Vincent in the command of the fleet, during which period, the enemy were literally locked up in port, and also to his incomparable retreat with five ships of the line and two frigates, before thirteen ships of the line and fifteen frigates of the enemy. This grand evolution exhibited such a proof of his superior energy and strength of mind in the most critical situation, that it is impossible to admire and extol it too much. The perfect safety with which he effected his retreat, and the order in which he conducted it in the face of one of the greatest sea officers France could ever boast of, must evidently impress upon the minds of the whole French naval service, the vast and decided superiority of the British navy. In fact, it almost goes to shew, that even so small a British force as that which I have described, under an able commander, is impregnable. Having been led into a kind of discussion respecting our navy, I shall, hereafter, request to call your attention to the state and distribution of it, upon the preliminary treaty of peace, upon the definitive treaty of peace, upon the remonstrance made to France respecting the affairs of Switzerland, and upon the delivery of the King's message. Upon signing of the preliminary treaty, our navy was triumphant throughout the world. The Northern Confederacy being dissolved, a friendly communication established with Denmark and Sweden; and the young Emperor of Russia (whose father had been at the head of the confederacy) ready to enter into our views. Not a ship of any nation, except those in strict amity with us, dared to traverse the ocean. The whole coasts of Holland, Flanders, France, Spain and Italy, were completely blockaded from the Erus even to the Adriatic; and the bugbear of invading this country, which the Consul had held out, and which had been too inconsiderately re-echoed forth by those in this kingdom, whose duty it was to convince the nation, that his threats must be impracticable, so long as our coasts were completely protected, and those of France and Holland entirely surrounded by more than *three hundred and eighty* vessels of war, including *sixty-seven* sail of the line, *seven* ships of fifty guns, *ninety-six* frigates, and *two hundred and fifteen* smaller vessels of war. This was the force on the first of October, *eighteen hundred and one*, employed in the defence of Great Britain and Ireland, in the annoyance of France and Holland, and in blockading their ports.* Nothing could more strongly shew the absurdity and fallacy of the threat held out by Buonaparté to invade us, than the fact of his not daring to send either the combined fleet, or even (literally speaking) a single vessel to sea. The few craft which had stolen along shore and got into Boulogne, for the purpose, as was said, of receiving troops to invade this country, were in part destroyed by the light flotilla under the command of the hero of the Nile; and those which escaped destruction, would have been brought away had they not taken the ground, or been secured by chains made fast on shore. To be guarded, however, at this juncture, against an evil of such magnitude as invasion, is undoubtedly the duty of government, by making every precautionary arrangement, and such a distribu-

* This force is exclusive of the fleet in the Mediterranean, and on the coast of Spain.

tion of the military force, as to meet the enemy at any and every point. But to hold out, under the circumstances which then existed, any thing tending to impress upon the minds of the people the probability of invasion, while this country was protected by such a marine as we had in 1801, was certainly deserving the severest reprehension, as an alarm of that kind could only contribute to check commercial speculation, to divert the attention of all descriptions of people from their usual avocations, and to disturb the public mind.—Such was the state of France and of this country, as far as regards the marine of the two nations in Europe, and the security of their coasts; while nearly the whole trade of the world was in our hands: for, if we except America, there was scarcely a vessel of any other nation passing on the seas.

Although I shall not urge the point, yet I do most firmly believe, that, had we but continued the war six months longer, a safe and honourable peace would have been the result; and that, we should now have been not only in a state of perfect tranquillity, but have been acknowledged the sovereign of Malta, with even less difficulty than we obtained the cession of Trinidada and the Dutch settlements in Ceylon. I shall reserve some observations which I propose to offer respecting Malta until another opportunity, when I shall call your attention to the state of our marine, upon the delivery of the King's message, which I consider as originating immediately from the discussion which took place relative to that Island.—— I shall now briefly state why I conclude Buonaparté would have made peace with this country upon safe and honourable terms, had the government held a language upon opening the negotiation, which our commanding situation then entitled us to assume. —— France, it will be recollected, had made peace with the Emperor and the Germanic Body, on the first of February, preceding the Preliminary Treaty of London; so that without a renewal of hostilities on the continent, or without a prospect of making a successful attack upon Ireland, (for as to an invasion of Great Britain, Buonaparté was convinced the attempt must have been fruitless;) the Consul was aware that his establishments could not be maintained, as the contributions he had levied in the Germanic States were exhausted, and he had no means to resort to for the support of his legions and his reduced fleet, but such as he could extort from his wretched subjects, or from his more wretched allies the Dutch and Spaniards; who were already groaning under the scourge with which he enforced his arbitrary mandates. The truth is, that France, Spain, Holland, Flanders, and the Italian Republic, as it is now called, were so completely exhausted, owing to the ravages they had sustained in the course of the late revolutionary war; and also, by a total stop being put to all commercial and maritime intercourse; by the entire annihilation of their foreign trade; by the capture of nearly all their colonies; and by their internal manufactures being completely at a stand from the want of capital and of hands to proceed; from this last circumstance France particularly suffered. To peace alone therefore, with this country, did the French nation look with anxiety, for the restoration of their colonies, their commerce, their navigation, and their manufactories.—Upon these grounds, I should contend, if I were inclined to expatiate on this subject, that the Preliminary Treaty with France should not have been made on the terms, or at the time it was concluded.—— I propose now, Sir, to make a few observations upon the grand expedition which Buonaparté sent to St. Domingo soon after the Preliminary Treaty was signed with this country. This expedition was, as you have justly observed in your Register, volume *first*, page *sixteen*, &c. far superior to any that had been dispatched to the new world at any former period. The anxiety which the sailing of that armament caused in this country, particularly amongst those who were immediately connected with Jamaica, induced the First Lord of the Admiralty to send, on the close of the month of January, 1802, after the mutiny had subsided in the Bantry Bay squadron, a reinforcement to Jamaica under Rear Admiral Campbell, the flag officer, in whose ship the mutiny first broke out. A farther reinforcement was ordered from the squadron at Gibraltar; but these divisions did not get to Jamaica until some time after Villaret's fleet had reached Cape François. Upon the arrival of the French armament at St. Domingo, there were at Jamaica *three* ships of the line and *one* old fifty gun ship. The ships of the line under the command of the French Admiral amounted to *twenty-two* sail, and he was soon followed by *ten* sail more; (including three Dutch ships) from Brest, Cadiz, and Toulon. The frigates and corvettes amounted to more than *forty* sail, and the whole were perfectly equipped for war, and not as transports, or even ships armed en flute, for the conveyance of troops. The consequence of this liberal acquiescence in the government of this country to the demand of France, upon the truce being made between the two nations, for what more can a Preli-

minary Treaty be called? was, that Great Britain was under the absolute necessity of sending reinforcements to Jamaica amounting to *twenty* sail of the line; so that upon the signature of the Definitive Treaty of Peace, (six months after the Preliminary Treaty) we had about *one hundred and twelve* vessels of war, including *twenty-three* sail of the line, which was in the whole *thirty-three* ships of war more than we had in that part of the world at the time of signing the Preliminary Treaty. The line of battle ships were farther augmented, till they amounted to more than *thirty* sail, before it was deemed adviseable to withdraw any part of them. The expense which the nation must have incurred (after having been several months in a state of pacification) in the maintainance of this immense naval establishment, in that quarter of the globe, is certainly of no trifling import; though it appears (notwithstanding it was double the force which had been kept in the West Indies at any period of the war,) to have almost entirely escaped the attention of Parliament; the conduct too of the First Lord of the Admiralty, inexcusable as it was, has not met with the smallest animadversion, with regard to the impolicy of suffering such a fleet as that which the Consul sent out, to depart from Europe completely armed for the purposes of war, instead of being as mere transports for the conveyance of troops. For, as you have justly observed, Toussaint had no fleet to oppose them; consequently, they ought to have been disarmed before they were sent out. In much of the reasoning you have advanced on the subject of this armament, I entirely concur with you; though I confess, I always entertained an opinion different from yours, as to its ultimate result; viz. the subjugation of the Blacks, and the entire restoration of the Colony to France.——To effect the reduction and conquest of the Blacks, Buonaparté certainly proceeded on a grand scale; but the nature of West-India warfare had not been duly considered; nor did the effects of the climate upon European constitutions appear to have been foreseen. We have now, however, an evidence of its fatality, not only from the official accounts of the French Generals, but from every other quarter through which there has been any intercourse with St. Domingo. In addition to the ships I have already stated, as having accompanied Villaret to that Island, or which, soon after followed him; several others, both from Brest and Toulon, have been sent thither with reinforcements of troops. The total number of ships of the line that have been dispatched to St. Domingo since the signing of the Preliminary Treaty is about *forty-six* sail, including a few which have made a second voyage; and the total number of troops that have arrived there, is little, if any short of fifty thousand men. Of the ships, all except seven or eight of the line, and a few frigates have returned to Europe; and these are now, it is imagined, on their way home. The Jamappe of seventy-four guns, is said to have arrived at L'Orient, from the Leeward Islands on the 28th ultimo—Of the troops sent to St. Domingo, not one fifth part are at this moment in existence; and not one tenth part fit for service. Such have been the destructive effects of the climate, and of the hostility they have experienced from the Blacks.——That the French have as yet abandoned St. Domingo, I cannot be induced to believe; but, that they will be obliged to abandon it, if the war between Great Britain and France continues, I have not the smallest doubt, provided they have not already entered into a treaty with the blacks, or do not speedily negotiate with them for the purpose of retaining some of the ports and the trade of the colony. It is, however, to be expected, and much to be wished, that, in consequence of the faithless conduct of Leclerc towards Toussaint, the blacks will not listen to such a proposal; for in such an event the evils that may hereafter result to Jamaica and the other British islands are incalculable. The French would not only, by such an arrangement with the blacks, derive all the advantages of supplying the black colonists with European manufactures, and receiving from them the whole produce of the island; but they might also, by some means or other, induce the blacks to recruit their forces for the purpose of invading our islands, and overturning the establishments. The only colonial warfare, which this country ought to undertake, is that of providing the blacks with the means of driving the French out of St. Domingo, by supplying them with arms, ammunition, and such other necessaries as they may be in need of, but not by attempting to make any conquests to the prejudice of the blacks, nor even holding any post or place which may be now in possession of the French, without a direct request on the part of the negro chieftains. Not a moment should be lost in sending the Jamaica squadron to blockade Cape François. Immediate steps should also be taken to open a communication with the black generals, and assurances should be given them, that cloathing and warlike stores should be furnished them, as soon as they possessed themselves of a port, in which our ships could with safety ap-

proach them.——The small Island of Tortue, to which the French have been lately in the habit of sending their convalescents, for the purpose of enjoying its salubrious breezes, and a vegetable diet, would surrender to any force that might be sent against it, on the first summons. About two years ago, I recollect having seen a pamphlet, in which a minute account is given of Tortue, and the peculiar advantages which this country might be expected to derive from the possession of it, and making it an entrepôt for the supplies of which it was supposed Toussaint might then be in need, and which the author of the pamphlet recommended should be furnished him through the medium of that island, which it was argued Toussaint might easily have been induced to concede to this country. If prompt measures be taken by ministers, and no treaty has been concluded between the French and blacks, by which the possession of the sea ports has been surrendered to France, the enemy will have no choice, except that of either submitting to the blockading fleet, or to their desperate foes, the blacks. In either case the trade of that immense island, must, in a great measure, come into our hands. As a sugar colony it is not likely to be cultivated by the blacks, at least if ever it should be, it will not for many years, unless Europeans settle amongst them; but the coffee and cotton plantations, and the cultivation of indigo may be by them well attended to, and will, in all probability, be extended and improved under their management. I shall not at present enlarge more on the subject of St. Domingo; but shall conclude this letter with a few remarks upon the debates which took place in the House of Commons on Monday last respecting the augmentation of the military establishment. It would seem from what the Secretary of War said upon the subject, it is the intention of government again to extend our military operations to the West Indies, with a view, no doubt, of bringing Martinique, St. Lucia, and the other French and Dutch colonies once more under the dominion of the British crown; but before such an important measure be determined on, is it not the duty of ministers and of Parliament to consider well the enormous expense incurred by this country in prosecuting the late war in that part of the world? and above all the immense number of valuable lives lost to the nation in the course of the eight years in which we were engaged in hostility with France; and that for this sacrifice, we have not at this moment one foot of French territory annexed to the British Empire? for all our conquests have been restored to France without the smallest reservation whatever, improved by British capital and industry, and in a higher state of cultivation, than even under the antient French monarchy. With this melancholy truth before us, and the declaration of his Majesty, that he has no views of conquest in contemplation, have we any reason to expect that a different line of conduct will be pursued on the termination of the present contest, should the whole of the French colonies fall into our hands? With this impression on my mind, I am most decidedly of opinion, that no military operations should be carried on against the colonies of France; but that the war abroad should be *solely* naval. Our own islands, most undoubtedly, should be kept in a state of perfect security, and should not again be exposed to the incursions of the brigands from the adjacent colonies of Guadaloupe, St. Lucia, or Martinique.——By allotting respectable military establishments to each of our own islands, by a judicious disposition of our naval forces in the West-Indies, and by a vigilant, active, and close blockade of the French Islands, these would, in all probability, be nearly as soon in our possession as though we were to proceed against them by regular attack, without incurring one twentieth part of the expense, and without sacrificing the lives of his Majesty's loyal subjects. —— You will conclude from this, Sir, that I am of opinion, our military operations should be confined entirely to Europe, and in that you will be perfectly right; for if we are ever to have peace with France, we must give the French people reason to know, that we are not only perfectly secure against the vain threats of the Consul, but that we can, and will alarm and assault their coasts and ports, from one extreme of their empire to the other. To make any effectual impression on France the following must be our system of operation.—The militia is now nearly embodied; the yeomanry and volunteers are called out; and the army is augmenting. For the defence of our own coasts, and for the offence of those of France, ten thousand men should be embarked with as little delay as possible. The troop ships which the late administration adopted with such manifest advantage, should be instantly brought forward for this service, a light flotilla with a number of bombs, and some fire vessels, should be attached to them, and put under the command of active, enterprizing, and discreet officers. Such, for instance in the military department as Generals Burraud and Moore; and in the naval department, as Sir Edward Pellew and

Sir Sydney Smith. Every other consideration should give way to such a plan of operations, which would not only tend to reanimate the whole British nation, but to depress and confound the government and people of France. It would give additional naval security to our coasts, even suppose the troop ships were not suffered to carry more than *ten* or *twelve* guns each, and it would be the quickest and best way of bringing *ten thousand soldiers* to any point, supposing, (impracticable as I conceive it) the enemy should effect an invasion of our country; but in this, I have already said, I have no belief. With respect to the security of Ireland, of which I have not so positively spoken, nothing can be more efficient and better calculated for its protection, than an embarked force of such magnitude; as it would instantly be ready, in the event of an invasion of that country to proceed directly to the spot where the enemy might have effected a landing.——A similar system should be adopted in the Mediterranean, for the purpose of alarming and annoying the whole coast of France and her allies.——In my next I shall probably give you some farther observations on the subject.——I am, Sir, yours—and *a Friend to my Country*.

TO THE EDITOR.

EARL ST. VINCENT.

Sir,——I read with much satisfaction in your Register of the 4th of June, some observations on the conduct of the Admiral who commanded on the Mediterranean station in the year 1798, in permitting the expedition for Egypt under Buonaparté, to be formed at Toulon, to leave that Port, and to reach its distant destination without the smallest interruption from the British fleet. —That a transaction of this extraordinary nature, and evidently so big with mischief, should have escaped animadversion at the time it happened, can only be accounted for by the general delirium which Lord Nelson's victory then occasioned in the nation, and the sanguine expectations entertained in consequence, that the great objects of this expedition must thereby be frustrated. The importance of the possession of Malta and of Egypt by our enemies, was, as your correspondent observes, as well understood in this country then as now; and no one who seriously reflected upon the measures that produced this evil, could for a moment hesitate to pronounce them criminally reprehensible. —Amongst the observations above alluded to, which by the by appear to have been incorrectly printed and not completed, it is insinuated, that half the force under Lord St. Vincent's command *, viz. twelve sail of the line with a large proportion of frigates and smaller vessels, would have been sufficient effectually to have blockaded the Spanish fleet in Cadiz, whilst the remainder might have been employed to watch the port of Toulon.—Every act of Lord St. Vincent's conduct, that I have heard mentioned, seems to prove this to have been his opinion likewise, as far as relates to the Spaniards; nor can it be wondered it should be so, the action off Cape St. Vincent, between H. L. with 14 sail of the British line, and Don Lewis Cordovo with 27 sail of the Spanish, having happened only a short time before; in which the latter lost 2 or 3 of their largest and best ships. It is evident that Lord St. Vincent employed not more in general than eight or nine ships of the line to blockade Cadiz, and they appear to have performed the service effectually for a great length of time, except on five or six days, when the Spanish Admiral (having stripped all the fishing boats employed in the fishery off Cadiz, of their men; and, having also taken all those belonging to the ships of war and other vessels he left in port) made an unsuccessful effort with 20 ships of the line, to surprise Sir William Parker, who then commanded the British squadron of eight sail; from which he returned in three or four days with disgrace into Cadiz; having contrived in that short time, to get some of his ships aground and damaged in other respects. When the account of the Spanish fleet being at sea reached Lisbon, on the 8th of February, 1798, where Lord St. Vincent then was with the body of his fleet, so little did his Lordship appear apprehensive for his squadron under Sir William Parker, or for any mischief the Spanish fleet was likely to do whilst at full liberty to act, that he would not suffer any of his ships to pass the bar of the Tagus, and join Sir William that day, although the commanders of several were ready and desirous to do so, the occasion being very favourable. And a week or ten days afterwards on his Lordship's re-establishing the blockade of Cadiz, where the Spanish fleet had re-assembled, he employed no more ships for the purpose than he had done before. His Lordship returned to the

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* Lord St. Vincent's fleet in March, April, and May, 1798, consisted generally of twenty-three or twenty-four sail of the line, of which, none less than seventy-four guns. Some fifty and forty-four gun ships on two decks, with a large proportion of frigates and smaller vessels. His Lordship had also at his disposal during a part of this time, six Portuguese ships of the line, and several of their frigates.

Tagus with the greatest part of his fleet, then all in good order for service, leaving Rear Admiral Sir John Orde, with 8 sail of the line and 3 or 4 frigates and smaller vessels, to continue the blockade, which he did until the month of April following.—Let us suppose however, notwithstanding the miserable state of the Spanish fleet in Cadiz, (and more wretched it need not be made appear, than a part, and the *élite* of it proved itself when afterwards engaged with Sir James Saumarez in the Gut of Gibraltar,) that it might have been most adviseable for his Lordship only to have detached, at an *earlier period*, the same number of ships from his fleet, that he sent *at last* off Toulon when too late, (viz. 6 sail of the line, one ship of fifty guns with several smaller,) instead of keeping them employed, as he usually did, in cruizing on remote stations for prizes, or in carrying passengers and *bullocks*, to the degradation and injury of the naval service; what might not have been effected by such a force under a skilful leader in delaying the sailing of the French fleet from Toulon, dependent as it was on other parts for its transports and supplies of every kind?—Retarding the departure of the expedition *even for a week*, would have been every thing; for, as it was, Lord Nelson with the reinforcement from England reached Malta three or four days only after the French left it. And who will pretend to say, had this force been sent off Toulon one month before Lord Nelson went there, that it might not have been the means of delaying the sailing of the French fleet more than that time. What professional man will assert that with such a force, joined by the Portuguese ships already mentioned, as being at Lord St Vincent's disposal, (and which were stationed soon after off Malta), Buonaparté might not have been arrested in his course, had he been encountered by it at sea, before our reinforcement arrived, with his numerous and ill appointed Armada!—Had he been so, what a difference would it have made to this country! Malta and Egypt would not have been possessed by the French; quantities of British blood and treasure would have been saved; and the war now commencing, might eventually have been prevented!—With such instances before us of successful enterprise on the part of the French during the last war, under circumstances the most desperate, as this now spoken of; that from Brest to Bantry Bay; and from the former port up the Mediterranean and back again; how can we reasonably expect to be safe from invasion at present, should the same unforeseen neglect prevail now among our naval rulers as did then? yet what hope can we entertain of better management from the same people, should we withhold our censure on their last conduct when so loudly called for?—Let us remember that Bantry Bay is more than 100 leagues distant from Brest; Toulon from Brest about 600; and Egypt from Toulon upwards of 500! yet that all these distances were passed and repassed by hostile armaments, except the last, without the smallest interruption from our fleets, then in the zenith of their power and greatness; whilst those of our enemies were at their lowest ebb. The expedition to Bantry Bay consisting of ships of war and transports, was some time at anchor in that port, and weeks at sea; and but for providential interference in our favour, must have been completely successful. That from Brest to the Mediterranean consisted altogether of ships of war, and was ten or twelve weeks on its tour before it returned with a part of the Spanish fleet from Cadiz.——That to Egypt was composed of all sorts of vessels, the worst provided, amounting to near 400, with 40 or 50,000 troops on board; yet, so confident did its commander appear of his security from being intercepted that he stopt and took Malta, that impregnable fortress, in his way, before proceeding to his final destination.——On these several occasions, we had only one port to watch and guard at a time, viz. Brest in two instances, and Toulon in one; and we had full and timely information of the designs carrying on in each. Comparing those bold attempts of distant invasion with these we are now menaced, how wide the difference, how much more easy to have been counteracted! An extent of near 200 leagues of enemies coast faces our own, in some parts not above eight or ten leagues distant from us, at most not exceeding thirty; full of harbours, from which expeditions for crossing the channel may be fitted out, and many of them difficult to be effectually watched. A few hours, a single night might land our enemies on our shores from different points, in small vessels, or even in open boats. Let us reflect on all this, and afterwards decide whether more skill and vigilance than was manifested by Lord St. Vincent in opposing Buonaparté, are not requisite at present to save us from serious mischief?—In palliation, for I never heard an attempt at justification of Lord St. Vincent's conduct on this occasion, I have heard some friends of his say, it would have been imprudent to have sent the force I have spoken of in March or April off Toulon, as we had no port in the

Mediterranean where to repair in case of damage, or where to procure supplies. What would Lord St. Vincent say to this pretended friend for his defence? or to any officer who should make such a difficulty, if directed by his lordship on service similar to that alluded to off Toulon? Let the officers of the navy answer this question!—But to reply to it effectually; Lord St. Vincent did send such a force off Toulon.——He sent a smaller.—He sent a larger when we had no port in the Mediterranean; when Malta had become a French port; and, when by the French preparations at Toulon, all the neutral states bordering the Mediterranean, were more than usually apprehensive of offending them.——Lord Nelson, when there with only three sail of the line, one fifty gun ship, and some frigates, had his own ship dismasted; and his lordship repaired to Sardinia without molestation.——His lordship afterwards, and before the glorious battle of Aboukir, watered and victualled his squadron in Sicily. But, if none of these supplies could have been had on the spot, might they not have been sent from Gibraltar? Have our ships on much less important occasions, never been at sea three or four months without going into port?—— Some others have said, we had evacuated the Mediterranean, and Lord St. Vincent had nothing to do with it!—Strange indeed would it be, if his lordship with a commission of commander in chief in the Mediterranean in his pocket, should have nothing to do with it; when Egypt and Malta, the keys to our Indian possessions, were threatened by the French, and he had ships to spare to defend them! If such an argument is worth any thing, it should have been used against our sending a squadron there at last, when too late fully to counteract Buonaparté; and not against our sending it earlier when it might have defeated his views altogether.——We had, it is true, evacuated the Mediterranean for some time, and the most fatal measure it was that we adopted during the whole war; had we, instead of employing our troops to parade uselessly with Lord St. Vincent in Portugal, whilst he lived upon our poor Consul at Lisbon, sent them together with some of our mercenaries engaged on disgraceful expeditions on the Continent, to take possession of Minorca, we might as easily have had that Island twelve months before it was attacked by Sir Charles Stuart, as we got it then; and, having that port, with such a fleet in the Mediterranean, as *by proper exertions* we might have had at the end of 1797, no Egyptian expedition would ever have been thought of by the French. The Austrians would have been successful in Italy, and the battle of Marengo would never have taken place!!

17th June, 1803. T. U.

EARL ST. VINCENT.

Observations on the Conduct of Admiral Sir John Jervis, K.B. now Earl St. Vincent, from the 6th of April, 1796.

Admiral Sir John Jervis left St. Fiorenza Bay in the Island of Corsica, the 6th of April 1796, with the squadron under his command, and proceeded to Toulon, to block up the French squadron. In the month of October following, Rear Admiral Man in the Windsor Castle of 98 guns arrived off Toulon, making the fleet under Sir John Jervis to consist of 22 sail of the line, including two sail of the line detached under Commodore Nelson off Genoa.——*Hostilities with Spain, were known to be commenced*, notwithstanding which, Sir John Jervis ordered Rear Admiral Man to return to Gibraltar. —On Admiral Man's passage to that fortress, his squadron of seven sail of the line, fell in with the Spanish fleet consisting of 36 sail of the line, and the Windsor Castle narrowly escaped being brought to *action*, and which might have endangered his whole squadron.—From Gibraltar Admiral Man sailed without delay for England; he was sensible Gibraltar was not a fit anchorage in time of war, for a squadron in the winter season, as the ships could not remain there for any number of days, because, the first hard Levanter (strong *east wind*) would have driven some of the ships over the Bay, and others into the Gut of Gibraltar, at the risk of being lost.—The latter part of October, Admiral Sir John Jervis returned to St. Fiorenza Bay in Corsica, to assist in evacuating that Island.—During the stay of the squadron in St. Fiorenza Bay, intelligence was received of the Spanish fleet of *thirty-six* sail of the line being off the Island of Corsica.—If Rear Admiral Man had not been detached with *his* squadron, Admiral Sir John Jervis would have had *twenty-two* sail of the line to have fought the Spaniards, and might have captured and destroyed *twenty* or *thirty* sail of the enemy, for the Spanish fleet during the three days they were off the Island of Corsica, sailed in a straggling manner, and their ships were much separated from each other.—What a glorious opportunity *at one blow*, was *here* lost, of destroying, or capturing, the naval force of Spain. —Had this event fortunately happened, Buonaparté never could have sailed for Egypt.—A disposeable naval force might in that case have been spared to have continued the blockade of Toulon. —What plea can Earl St. Vincent frame for reducing his force by *detaching* Admiral Man, who had at that time no service to perform: although, prior to his arrival off Toulon, he had with seven sail of the line been many months blocking up, in the most officer-like manner, Admiral Richery with eight sail of French ships of the line in Cadiz harbour?—On the *appearance* of hostilities with the Spaniards, the Marquis of Bute (the British Ambassador and Plenipotentiary in Spain,) recommended to Admiral Man without delay to reinforce with his squadron Admiral Sir John Jervis off Toulon, and which Rear Admiral Man did.— It may be presumed Sir J. Jervis directed Admiral Man to return to Gibraltar, because, a British Ambassador with the best intentions and priority of intelligence, should not directly or *indirectly* dictate discretionally to any part of his squadron, although, by advice only.—The above is perfectly

true, and which no one can deny.—When the Spanish fleet was off Corsica, the Island of Elba was in possession of the British, and Corsica was not at that time evacuated by the British troops, who had possession of Calvi, Bastia, and St. Fiorenza. —The probable reason for evacuating Corsica, was the knowledge that a war with Spain was not far distant.—Had the Spanish fleet been captured or destroyed off that Island, other directions might have been sent from England relative to it.—— After the evacuation of Corsica in the month of November, 1796, the squadron under Sir John Jervis sailed for Gibraltar, to procure a supply of provisions and coals. They arrived there after a passage of three weeks.—The tanks being out of order, no water could be procured though sheets of water fell.—Gibraltar is well known to be a dangerous anchorage in the winter, especially for a large squadron.—Was not Sir John Jervis acquainted with this circumstance, and also, that he was going to Lisbon? Could not the victuallers have met the squadron at Lisbon? Or, if already at Gibraltar, could they not have sailed with the squadron to the Westward, and as frequently happens, been cleared of their cargoes at sea?—— The squadron did not leave Gibraltar until the Courageux of 74 guns was shipwrecked, and only 50 persons out of a crew of 650 men, saved.—The Zealous of 74 guns, and Gibraltar of 80 guns, were damaged by striking on rocks under water, and *both* were near being lost.—The Zealous was afterwards hove down at Lisbon, and as the Gibraltar's damages could only be repaired in a dock, she was sent to England.—In the middle of December the squadron sailed for Lisbon, and on its arrival off the Tagus, the signal was made by Sir John Jervis, for the commanding officers of divisions, to lead their divisions into port.—The channel into Lisbon is one of the most awfully dangerous, perhaps, in the world, because the surf beats high, and with uncommon violence on the North and South Catchops, the two great shoals at the entrance of the Tagus, and between which the squadron had to sail.—The Britannia of 100 guns (the flag ship of Vice Admiral Thompson) sailed so badly that she retarded part of the squadron, and many ships were in consequence obliged to anchor.—A store ship (44 guns) was, owing to this, near being lost: but was saved by the assistance of boats, and she again in the evening anchored (to the Eastward of the Bougee Fort) near the South Catchop.—The Bombay Castle of 74 guns, (that separated a few days before in chase) was coming in from sea, and about six o'clock in the evening, in an endeavour to avoid the store ship by passing to the southward of her, the Bombay Castle broached to and went on the South Catchop, where she was finally lost.—Had Sir John Jervis allowed the ships to put into port as most convenient, all the squadron (without heading the Victory, his flag ship) would have been safely anchored in the Tagus before dark, and the channel would then have been left clear for the Bombay Castle.—Let any one attempt to refute this assertion.—The latter part of January 1797, Admiral Sir John Jervis waited for his dispatches at Lisbon, and at *half ebb* made the signal for the squadron to weigh. The consequence of doing this, and not taking a proper time of tide to sail out of the Tagus before the *flood tide* made, was the St. George of 98 guns, (Capt. Peard) meeting the flood tide and wind to the northward betwixt the Catchops, and the tide of flood setting to the south-east, carried her on the South Catchop, where she beat off her rudder and was near being totally lost, but was saved by the great exertions of her captain, who, with the St. George returned to Lisbon.—Could not Admiral Sir John Jervis have taken a proper time of tide to sail with the squadron, and left a frigate to follow him with his dispatches? When Admiral Sir Horatio Nelson, K. B. sailed to attack Teneriffe, his orders were positive so to do. Neither Sir Horatio Nelson nor any officer in his squadron knew where to land, or the state of the fortifications; a description of those at Santa Cruz may not be unacceptable to the Public.— The militia of the Island of Teneriffe amounts to seven or eight thousand men, and the garrison generally consisted in time of peace of twelve hundred soldiers, besides artillery men. There are four circular forts on an extensive esplanade behind the line wall. These forts are not to the northward of the landing place in the centre of the curtain of the line wall.—The fire of these forts crosses each other, and commands the esplanade.—The Governor's house is about two hundred yards from the northernmost fort.—The guns of the forts are 24 pounders, and are under arches, and the parapet is above the guns. Each fort has a ditch and draw bridge, nor are the forts commanded by any hill near, except one in the town, and which is built upon and covered with houses.—The line wall reaches north and south, beyond where the anchorage extends, and is mounted with heavy cannon.—There are two demi-bastions with flanks, and a straight curtain. —The two faces of the demi-bastions, the two flanks and the curtain have twenty-six pieces of heavy cannon mounted upon them to defend the wharf, and which is the only one.—The wharf projects from the centre of the curtain some distance into the sea.—The centre of the curtain is open about eight feet, and there is a large chevaux-de-frize seven feet high, and which closes the centre of the curtain every night.—About the middle of the wharf is a draw bridge, and from thence on each side of the wharf, there is an half chevaux-de-frize (the points outwards) all the way to the wall of the curtain; so that, at night, when the draw bridge of the wharf is hauled up, it is impossible to pass to the curtain. It is by no means difficult to land *four thousand* soldiers with field pieces, without any accident to be apprehended from the surf; but this landing cannot be made at the town of Santa Cruz.—How many brave men were here sacrificed? The fault was not Sir Horatio Nelson's.—Where does blame then attach itself? What motive could induce Earl St. Vincent to send so small a force to Teneriffe to capture the Spanish treasure? Was it that the late Hon. General Sir Charles Stuart and the British troops under his command at Lisbon might not have a share? Hoping to reserve all the plunder for the navy alone.—For *plunder* the treasure on shore must certainly have been, and not prize money: and, therefore, the treasure (had it been captured,) must have been divided according to the directions of the King, and in such proportions as his Majesty thought proper. —The fact is, the Spanish treasure was not at Teneriffe, but was afterwards supposed to have been landed at one of the Western Islands, and brought from thence in Portuguese men of war to Lisbon, and by American merchant ships to Cadiz.—When the British fleet under Earl St. Vincent were cruizing off Cadiz, two Spanish frigates laden with treasure to a great amount, hailed Earl St. Vincent's flag ship, at twelve o'clock at night; and no notice being then taken of them, they

made their escape in shore, and immediately landed their treasures in safety. Whose fault was this? What would have been the consequence, if an inferior admiral or captain had acted in a similar manner? As Vice-Admiral Sir John *Orde* could not obtain a court-martial on Earl St. Vincent for his conduct towards him, Earl St. Vincent may, perhaps, consider himself as placed beyond the reach of all law; but his lordship must at the same time be aware that he cannot soar above the opinions of mankind, whose judgment will be formed from actions alone. B. N.

CONDUCT OF THE ADMIRALTY.

Sir,——I am a plain man, not spending my time in contest, but a lover of truth; and having read in the Times, an answer, as it is termed, to your assertion, that "by the mode which the Admiralty has adopted in distributing apprentices to the shipwrights, in a few years the modellers and draftsmen will be extinct." I request that you will be pleased to insert my rejoinder to it, as I have the opportunity of being somewhat conversant with the subject in question.—The writer says, "It was not this Board of Admiralty, but their predecessors, who procured an order in council, &c. &c." I cannot exactly say, who it was procured it; but this every dock-yard man does know, that no such mode was ever put in practice relative to apprentices until the present Board of Admiralty presided: and most unfortunately, like all the new regulations, this hath given general discontent. I am greatly apprehensive that this cannot be benefitting the nation; but with the present Admiralty every thing must be changed; every thing must be novel; for former regulations, by whomsoever planned, however they have stood the test of time and experience, will not do now. Unluckily the impossibility of complying with some of the new orders obliged the Board to cancel them, and have recourse to those again which they had superseded. Men *would not*, *could not* submit to them. Whether the present introduced mode is more eligible than the former, remains to be determined, but the boys now picked up are chiefly of the lowest order of the people.—Shipwrights not thinking it worth their while to bring their children up to a trade, where the *extra* is taken away, which formerly was universally allowed for a servant; and which the *deserving* were always in the hope of receiving in their turn with their apprentices.—Whereas, now however many extra hours the master works with the apprentice by his side; he neither receives any extra advantage from the extra labour of the apprentice, nor does the apprentice (though forced to work such extra) receive any more for the performance of his duty, either now or in expectation hereafter. At this very instant, *three* days for one are paid to the shipwright, if he works the hours, which have by the trade been stipulated to go for such; all able working men now receive at least two days, or what is termed double days pay; while the apprentice, who works all that time, only receives a single day's pay. When this informant set forth, that "formerly the master was paid three days for one, in the first year, nay, in the first week of his apprentices time," if he came within the line of truth; it was nevertheless, a misrepresentation. For what was the fact? Government had settled what should be a day's work, what should be considered as two and three days. If the apprentice worked such time (and not otherwise) the master certainly was paid for him; it was meant he should be. But what was he paid? Only the first year at the small rate allowed by government for the apprentice of 1s. and 2d. per diem; increasing 2d. every year, and to the last year and day of his apprenticeship, his pay was still inferior to the workmen. This is the true statement, and surely it was fair. So when they worked on board of ships, sleeping hard, and from their homes, they were allowed by establishment additional pay; likewise at their dinner time when deprived of it, as some compensation for such deprivation. This was the regulation of those who had well considered the business, and which had stood the test of time. It would have been wise, if those who have made the changes had duly reflected on a trite adage: "Let well alone." The giving one-third of the pay to the apprentice (mind if he behaves well), does not induce parents to place their children; for they were accustomed to give them their board during their apprenticeship, in short, to find them in every thing. This expense ceased the day they were out of their time; when in their turn, they could, if necessary, assist their parents with the pleasing prospect of obtaining, probably, in the course of time an apprentice themselves, and of reaping the same advantages, which they had before been the means of giving to their masters. This is now no longer an object of pleasing expectation. Formerly people of some property placed their sons at school with the intention of apprenticing them, after gaining a proper education, to the master shipwright or his assistants, or to the master mast maker, master boat-builder, &c. in the fair hope of their succeeding, if fortunate, to those employments themselves; they gave with them from 20 to 80 pounds.—When deserving, the masters, as they rose, made a point of bringing them forward. It was the fair condition of the obligation.—It was right individually, and in a national view.—The writer again says, "the doceur to the master shipwright is the indispensable and only key to the mould loft." There is no reason for supposing that the masters of the shipwrights are worse than other men, (although they have been shamefully stigmatized;) but, I would ask, in whose hands can the key be so properly kept? The fallacy of the above representation will plainly be seen, when it is known, that master shipwrights, and even surveyors of the navy have risen to those posts, having served their apprenticeship to persons in the yard very inferior to the master shipwright. This violent correspondent has either very superficial knowledge of the subject, or he lets out only just as much as will answer his purpose, using the shadow of truth, while he hides the substance. But what will he say when I make it public, (for I will not call it informing him,) that by the new and wise regulations, every shipwright apprentice now indented is positively bound to the master shipwright; so his indenture runs; and the man, who receives the trifling advantage from him is called his instructor; he has no other right in, or authority over him; and consequently, has no stimulus to a care of him. It would be unreasonable to suppose the master shipwrights immaculate, however the great Board may be so.—A certain number of these apprentices must successively go to the mould loft; and any further comment is unnecessary. The writer next says, "Mr. Cobbett pretends (and *I assert*) that the Admiralty have been obliged to resort to the assistance of warranted carpenters of ships (i.e. the master carpenters) to do the com-

mon duty of working shipwrights, &c." And he adds, "that when the caulkers and shipwrights in the merchants' yards refused to work, the carpenters of ships offered their service."—I must own, I never heard this before; but I well know, how *reluctant* these officers are to be classed with working men in the King's yard at this time. He is very right in saying some caulkers were discharged; for these, although they were only common men, refused to go; and would to a man, but from their having families, so they were afraid to refuse. Not one of them would have been again entered, had it not been from the impossibility of finding others to supply their places; old men and boys being the only caulkers left in any of the dock-yards, so very general was the refusal. He again says, "that if there is not three years consumption of timber on hand, every clerk at the Admiralty knows, that one of the Board's standing orders has been neglected." That the Navy Board have been cramped in all their proceedings, from the commencement of the present Admiralty to this day, is well known to every clerk at the Admiralty, and to every other public office; and that the harshness and rigidity of the Admiralty have been such, that merchants are positively averse to contract, is fully experienced. No conversant person, of the many thousands who are masters of the subject will attach the least blame to the Navy Board; but admire their patience and unabated zeal in the performance of their duty.—Knowing the value of room in your paper, I will not obtrude at present myself farther, only requesting you will be pleased to give this an early place, as my remarks would have been forwarded to you sooner had the answer, which I have now replied to, come in my way.——I am, Sir, &c. &c. S. T.

LETTERS TO A FRIEND IN THE COUNTRY.

LETTER I.

London, June 26, 1803.

My dear, Sir,——I received yours of the 24th yesterday.——Your inquiries about news, and about the measures, which are taken by government in the present emergency of the country, are certainly most seasonable. I wish I could send you word, that there was apparent any where that spirit, which the moment requires. But, neither in the country at large, nor in the Parliament, nor above all, in the members of administration, can I perceive any appearance of vigour or exertion, adequate to the occasion——It is therefore, with rather a heavy heart, that I sit down to answer your queries.——I will not, however, delay doing so, and, as you have the good nature to set some value on my opinion, I will detail at some length to you my sentiments on the present situation of affairs.——I confess to you, that I view that situation with the greatest anxiety and apprehension. Our friends here frequently rally me on the dejection and lowness of spirits, which such a view has produced on me. But I confess, neither their jokes nor their disagreement as to the causes of it have been able to make me shake it off.—Indeed, it is in a great degree produced by that very disagreement of sentiment; by that want of sense of the magnitude of the danger, which I perceive in them, and in the nation in general.—I know that myself, and those who think like me, are called desponding persons.—I do not deny it. I do despond.—But why? Not because we are at war; not because France is powerful; not because Buonaparté is implacable; not because we are threatened with invasion, and because invasion by a French army, led on by French enthusiasm, and supported with French courage and perseverance is a most tremendous danger; but because, people will not believe that this danger exists; because people are so persuaded of the difficulties and dangers of such an attempt, that they think that the enemy will not dare to meet these dangers and difficulties, or meeting them must yield to them; because people reckon up all the difficulties of the passage; and talk of the difficulties of embarkation and disembarkation, with as much pride and satisfaction, as if they were securities of our own erecting; and enumerate with great pomp, all the chances of their being met by our cruisers, and all the havock that a single frigate could make in such a rencounter.—In short, because people trust to the "Little Ditch," (to use a common expression,) that surrounds us; to "our Wooden Walls," to the chances against invaders, and in short, to any thing but their own exertions and efforts.——Now this feeling, or rather this want of feeling, I must attribute to a want of spirit or to a proper sense of the danger to which we are exposed.——That the feeling exists, is I think undeniable. It is proved, I think, by what we daily hear of and see now in town.——Balls and routs, and parties of pleasure, buying and selling, horse dealings at Tattersall's; auctions at Christie's, &c. now all going on just as if we were in a state of perfect safety, or to use the soporific phrase of the Doctor, in "profound "peace."—All this is very pretty; but, I confess it alarms me. "They ate, they drank, they mar-"ried, they were given in marriage, till the flood "came and swept them all away."——But if the thing wanted further proof, I should say that we had it, in the present acquiesence of the country under the total inertness of government, and their slowness in bringing forward any measure for resisting or preventing the danger.——A plan has, indeed, lately been brought forward in the House of Commons by Mr. Yorke.——By the favour of our friend,.... I was in the gallery and heard that gentleman's opinion of the business; and I have just received from the same friend the printed copy of the bill, as completed and perfected by them in the Committee; and I confess, both the speech and the bill have filled my gloomy mind with increased gloom; so inadequate, so miserably short of the emergency, and of my expectation have they both of them fallen.—Of that measure I shall have occasion to say something presently.—As to want of spirit in the country, I do not assert that there is no spirit; but I do assert, notwithstanding, that I have been told that that assertion has been flatly contradicted by high authority, that none is apparent. I know not what that high authority may say in the House of Commons; but this I know, that out of doors I do not meet a single person, who does not complain of it. It may be that the spirit exists, but has not been drawn forth. I admit nothing has been done to draw it forth, by those whose business it was to do so; and I think that is no small charge amongst the many grievous charges that ought to be brought against the ministers, but I say, that events which have happened, and things we have witnessed within these few weeks ought to have called forth that spirit; and, if it existed, I think would have called forth that spirit, notwithstanding all the doctor's soporifics, and notwithstanding all the impediments, which his weak, slow, and inefficient administration, throws in the way of all manly and spirited exertion. I, therefore, for one, think this spirit does not exist, this

old British spirit, which formerly could not bear to hear, that one Englishman could not beat three Frenchmen; and would not allow the French government to make one step towards attacking the liberty of any other nation without avenging that nation, and that glorious cause.—Nor will I have to be told, that these arguments and the assertions which I am making, are those which have dispirited and still dispirit the country. Those who have made such assertions, have I am sorry to say been much too little attended to, to have been able to produce so great an effect.—But, I assert further, that those arguments have no tendency that way.—I have often heard that a coward may be kicked into courage; and I think a country by being reproached for want of spirit, may be roused to exertion; but I deny that a brave man was ever kicked into a coward; or that a country can be made spiritless by being reviled for its want of spirit——With respect to the extent and reality of the danger, never having as you know turned any part of my attention to the consideration of military matters, I can be no judge of that; but having some little observation, and a good deal of attention to the opinions of others capable of judging on these matters, I think, I can assert—1st. that the difficulties of embarkation, either in the respect of procuring the means of embarkation in ships and boats, or in the actual employment of these means, are not near so considerable to the French government in possession of Holland, as people are inclined to persuade themselves.——2d. That the experience of the last war ought to convince us that no reliance can be put in a blockading fleet, as an absolute security against the sending out an expedition, and the safe passage of that expedition to the shores of this country; and —3d. That supposing a French army landed, the contest would then not be easy, nor the victory on our parts quite clear, in the present state of our army.—And this brings me to consider the plan of defence as opened by the Secretary at War the other day, or as it is called of the army of reserve. ——That plan as I understood it, and as it is confirmed by the bill now laying before me, is shortly this.—To raise by ballot 50,000 men; 40,000 in Great Britain, and 10,000 in Ireland; who are liable to serve, the principals or ballotted men for four years, the substitutes and volunteers for four years, or during the war; and their service to extend to Great-Britain, Ireland, Jersey and Guernsey, though not to Alderney."—These men are to be ballotted for in the same manner, and with the help of the same machinery as the Militia; they are to be formed "*into fifty battalions of a thousand men each*," who are to be officered by officers appointed by his Majesty out of the half pay list;—the half pay list of the marines;—and the East-India Company's service.—How or when the non-commissioned officers and drummers are to be provided, we are not told; this I think is a most important omission, because there is nothing more requisite to the promotion of a young corps than good non-commissioned officers, and these will be wanted immediately; and, because I do not conceive whence 6000 men of that description, perfectly understanding their business, able and willing to attend to it, honest, active, intelligent, are to be procured; and certainly till they are procured, unless that promotion will be entirely sufficient, all the rest must stand still. But supposing these non-commissioned officers procured, and supposing too that there is found no difficulty in the ballot, no difficulty in getting men, no reluctance on their part to submit to this call, this feeble call; supposing all this, what have we obtained?—Why we have obtained this—That we shall have fifty battalions of a thousand men each, all undisciplined, unformed, unused to the handling of arms, scarcely one of them knowing his right hand from his left, or the muzzle of a musquet from the butt, unaccustomed to restraint and impatient of it; and these put under the command of officers selected from a list, in which, undoubtedly, are the names of very brave, very meritorious, and very excellent men; but in which, are also the names of many, who have retired from discontent and dissatisfaction, from dislike of the service, some too placed there as punishment and disgrace, (witness the orders which were issued by the Commander in Chief, and published in every newspaper in the kingdom only a few weeks ago, by which two officers were put on the half-pay list as a punishment, for having encouraged their men to commit highway robberies,) and many, and these the best, the most zealous, and the most brave, from wounds, or from age, and that is from incapacity to serve. But this is not all; the officers for these new corps are to be selected not from this list merely, but from other lists and other services; and I must say, that I look with no little concern at the jealousies, disputes, and heart-burnings that this mixture of different services is likely to give rise to.—This being the plan, I ask military men in what space of time they can expect, or even hope, these new levies to be in such a state of discipline and preparation to be fit to meet a French army?——These being then, I think, the principal and leading objections to this plan, I could just suggest to your mind, what I think would have been a much better one.——In the first place.—I like the ballot very much.—I should, however, have first observed, that some of the inferior parts of this scheme are likewise, objectionable.—The limitation of the service is bad, and the allowance of substitution will, I fear, give the death-blow to the recruiting for the army; which has been languishing extremely of late, and therefore, does not want a very heavy blow to destroy it altogether.——To return then to the ballot, that is I think good, we are now too much in want of men, and in too great hurry for them, (thanks to the prudent economy of his Majesty's ministers) to trust to the more slow and less certain methods of recruiting; but I object to the limitation of the service.—In point of time, I think that is not so objectionable; five years or six years I should have liked better than four; but in point of service I would have had no limitation whatever.—I would in short, have ballotted to fill up the regiments of the line. I have heard people say, that this would be unconstitutional.—I deny it.—It may be a strong measure, and only such as ought to be resorted to in cases of great and imminent danger; but I assert, that there must be a power and a right in the legislation to resort to them in these cases; and I maintain such a case now exists.—With respect to any dislike or opposition that (it may be supposed) would have been raised against it, I cannot believe there would have been any.—I really think there would have been less chance of it then than there is now. Those inclined to grumble or oppose, will grumble and oppose now; there is enough of hardship, (if hardship indeed it can be called) for that; and many too will grumble now, who would not have grumbled then.——A great and animating call for great exertion is much more readily complied with, than a feeble call for less exertion.—— And the exertion here is very very little short, of

what it would have been in the other case.—The difference is not so much in the exertion called for, as in the call itself.—I may be willing to submit to the greatest sacrifices for a great object, but am I to be neccessarily equally willing to submit to very near as great sacrifices for the sake of obtaining an object infinitely short of the other? By this limitation of the service they will not quiet the murmurs which might have been raised in the other case, and which would have been unfounded; and they do create proper and well-founded murmurs of another sort.——But granting this point if required.—I do not yet see the propriety of putting these new raised men into separate corps.—Every man must perceive and feel, that new men unaccustomed to military service of any sort or kind, and having no notion of it, must acquire what it is necessary that they should acquire before they can be made soldiers, much quicker and much more effectually when mixed with old soldiers, than when joined to men as raw and as ignorant as themselves. No one can doubt, that a countryman placed between two old steady soldiers, will be much sooner steady himself, than if his neighbours on each side are as unsteady as himself.—And this perhaps, is the least important part of the duty and knowledge of a soldier, and that too in which the society of old soldiers is the least beneficial.—It is the habits of a soldier, the attention to discipline, the promptitude to obey orders, the dress, the cleanliness, the mode of doing every thing, the food, &c. that a man must acquire the knowledge of before he is really a soldier; and which he can only acquire, by a long and tedious process of study and tuition, and this very imperfectly, but by being mixed with and associating with old and experienced soldiers.—— It is clear, therefore, that if it is possible, it is very desirable indeed, to mix these new recruits with old experienced men, and not to form them into separate corps; and the moment is most apt for doing this; for it so happens, (how I will not now inquire, but which I think some member of the House of Commons would do no more than his duty if he did inquire) that while ministers are here collecting a parcel of soldiers together, who will have scarcely any really efficient officers, and no efficient non-commissioned officers at all, they have in the line, a great number of regiments complete as to commissioned and non-commissioned officers, but very incomplete as to privates; many as I understand, are about $\frac{1}{2}$ or $\frac{1}{3}$ of their compliment short.——Now why, when this is the case, and when too the recruiting is almost at a stand still, and will be quite so by this measure in a few days; why ministers will persist in putting these men into separate corps, instead of employing them to fill up the old corps which are incomplete; is one of those mysteries which the sapient Addington can explain, I doubt not to his own satisfaction, but which I doubt very much whether he can explain to mine; or to that of any reasonable man.—So much for the plan as it is, and what I think it ought to be with respect to the state of our forces, and their capability of maintaining with advantage a contest with a French army supposed to be landed, I am now as you must know very incapable of forming an opinion, but I will say, that as far as observation and attention can enable me to judge, I should think it an indisputable fact, that any contest must be a very disadvantageous one to that side, which, against experienced veteran troops, headed by excellent officers, and animated with the remembrance of former victories, with the hopes of new laurels, and the desire of an immense plunder, as would be the case with the French army, should they bring a force composed of regular veteran troops, small or numerous, and with its ranks incomplete, a militia most brave indeed, and most zealous, but without experience of real service; and lastly, this army of reserve, still less experienced than the militia; perhaps, discontented, probably undisciplined, and certainly quite raw to the business; however bravely that force might be headed, and however ably it might be conducted; and such disadvantage under the present plan undoubtedly will be ours.—I have been lead to this discussion of the plan for raising this army of reserve, by an endeavour to trace to its proper source that stupid idea of security, which seems to pervade all ranks of people in this country at the present eventful crisis.——And though it may not appear very nearly allied to the subject of this letter, perhaps, you will excuse the digression however long it has been.—And I think you ought to do so, because, not only in itself it is a most important consideration, but I think, in this measure you may observe the weakness, slowness, and inability of the present ministers; who are, (I think it is proved by this tardy and paltry measure) unequal to the difficulties of the present moment. There is one thing more which I wish to urge to you before I let you go, though my letter has already swelled to an enormous size, and that is this, that I believe truly, as I hope most sincerely, that your surmise is perfectly unfounded; viz. that people are less eager to oppose the French and to betake themselves to active measures to resist them, from the circumstance that they have not that true, genuine horror of France and of French dominion, which they ought to entertain. I certainly hope so, and I believe so too, for this reason, that I do conceive it utterly impossible after the experience of what has been passing before our eyes for twelve years, without one month's interruption, or one single exception, for every man not to perceive, that of all the dreadful visitations which it has pleased God to bring on men, the most dreadful is the dominion of France; and that it is by brave, open, and unremitting opposition to it, that it can ever be avoided; that no intreatics of mercy, no obsequiousness, no soothing and coaxing, no base submission or unmanly acquiescence has once disarmed its fury; or blunted the edge of its anger, or stopped the progress of its flight.—That it makes use of the folly and baseness of others, whenever that folly and baseness serves its own purposes, and no longer; and then punishes it as it deserves.—That treason has always had its support and conjunction, but that the traitor has never escaped its vengeance; and lastly, that friends and foes, abettors and opponents have always been involved by it in one ruin; under which there can be no consolation, and no comfort, but in a conscientious feeling that every thing has been done, whenever and wherever the opportunity has presented itself, not only to stop and check the progress of the monster, but to destroy it; not to curtail his power, but to annihilate it; not to draw his teeth, but to pierce his heart.——Pardon me, my dear friend for this long intrusion, and believe me, Yours.

INQUISITOR.

LETTER II. *July* 2, 1803.

MY DEAR SIR,—Your thanks for my last communication, though so long, and your kind compliments about it, and the wish you express that

I may continue my correspondence, are motives not to be resisted by me for again taking up my pen to send to you a few further observations on what formed the principal subject of my letter of the 26th ult.

In that letter I detailed to you a plan for the Army of Reserve as opened by the Secretary at War, in a speech which I had the good fortune to hear, and as explained by the bill he brought in in pursuance of that plan; which bill was at the time I wrote to you lying before me in the complete and perfect form to which he had brought it in the Committee. It was natural enough, I imagine, for any man to conceive when he had heard that opening, and had seen the bill go through the first and second readings, and then come out of the Committee with all the blanks filled up by the ministers, and no proposition of theirs rejected, and found that the bill so perfectly agreed altogether with the speech, it was only natural, I say, in that case to imagine, that one was then in possession of the whole plan. I certainly thought so, and in consequence made the remarks on it which I sent to you. But it seems the measures of the present ministers are not to be judged of by common rules and the usual modes of proceeding; no, they are so wise and so enlightened, that they are not content to tread the common track, but must trace out an entire new course for themselves. So in this case, other men of the ordinary sort, would have explained the whole plan in the opening, and illustrated it by the bill; but not so Mr. Yorke. The speech was all a farce, the first and second readings nothing to the purpose, the first Committee a joke; for lo! now have the House of Commons been employed a whole week in altering, amending, and correcting this perfect bill, and have done so, so effectually and so completely, that it is as different from the first as light from darkness. It is changed even to the very name: at first it was a bill for raising an Army of Reserve—now it is "the Additional Army Bill;" and yet the friends of ministers do tell me with a grave face, that the plan as it now stands, was the original plan, and what it was always intended to bring it to; they may tell me so, and repeat it to me, till they are tired; but they must pardon me if I disbelieve them: for foolish as I believe them, mysterious as I understand they are (and I seldom knew a person mysterious, but for sake of concealing stupidity and folly, and it is this, I fancy, that makes the present Treasury Bench so very mysterious); I do not yet suppose, that they would be foolish and mysterious enough to do that, which such an assertion conveys the idea of their doing. What does this assertion accuse them of? Why nothing short of this: that at a moment when there is the greatest necessity according to their own statement of bringing forward the most effectual measures for the defence of the country, and the repulsion of the invading enemy, and that as speedily as possible; that at that moment though they have a plan ready, which is far from bad and ineffectual (though I contend it yet does not go far enough) they choose to bring forward a feigned plan, which falls infinitely short of this real one, and amuse the House of Commons and the country with this joke for four or five days, for the sole purpose, as it should seem, of spending another week on the correction and improvement of it.

I will now endeavour to explain to you the plan, as now at length perfected by the House of Commons as far as I am able to understand it, and will then endeavour to trace the strange conduct of ministers to its real cause, and to point out to whom all the best parts of this plan are to be attributed. Having been through the progress of the business, a pretty constant attendant by the favour of ——— in the gallery of the House, till I, with others, was turned out on Thursday last; and having paid great attention to the arguments used on this business on all sides of the House, I think I shall be able to do this pretty correctly.

The plan as far as the ballot goes continues the same as it was at first, but the men when balloted are not to be formed into separate and distinct corps as formerly, but are liable to be ordered to join any regiment his Majesty shall choose; the limitations of service as to place continues the same (except with the addition of Alderney), with respect to time it is lengthened to five years; the men are to be allowed to enlist, if they choose, into the regular service, and are intitled upon their doing so to a discharge from their present engagement. You will remark how much superior this plan is to the old one. I, however, still regret one thing, *viz.* the limitation of service as to place; I cannot help lamenting that it was not extended to Europe at least. However the great point has been gained, that of filling up with these new raised men the old regiments and the regiments of the line, which I am sorry to say, are, are as far as I can judge from what I hear, most horribly deficient as to numbers. The men who remain over and above after these corps are completed must of course be formed into separate ones, but these are to be attached each of them to some one other regiment, which is to be looked upon as its parent regiment, and any vacancies in which it is to supply as these vacancies may arise. A most excellent idea this, and one, which, if we shall ever have quiet times, and times fit for new modelling and arranging the army, may lead to the very greatest possible good.

Such is the plan as it is now sent out of the House of Commons to the Lords. To whom it is to be attributed, God knows; but this I know, to whom I think it ought to be attributed, at least, to whom all its good parts, all its efficacy, and excellence are to be attributed. I think, when you have read Mr. Windham's speech, which was delivered directly after the plan was opened, you will not hesitate in agreeing with me, that it is to him that the country is indebted for every good point in the plan, and that it is not that gentleman's fault, the fault neither of his intention, nor of his activity, nor of his ability, if it is not much better than it yet is. Indeed the conduct of ministers seems to have been throughout dilatory and strange in the extreme. It appears by the papers published by them on the breaking out of hostilities, that they have perceived for above a year, that hostile mind in the councils of France of which they had been warned at the time of the treaty of Amiens; but whose existence they at that time denied. It is considerably above four months since by the Message of the 8th of March, they warned the House of the probability of war; it is six weeks since the actual commencement of hostilities; and yet it was only on Wednesday last that they brought to any thing like a well digested scheme, a plan absolutely necessary, as they themselves state, for securing the country against an invasion. On the face of this statement these ministers appear to have been tardy and dilatory in the extreme. Indeed many persons suspect and assert pretty

roundly, that had they not been goaded on by Mr. Pitt, even this plan would never have been thought of. On the other supposition held out, as I said before, by the friends of ministers, *viz.* that this plan, as now perfected, was that which originally had been in contemplation, I think, something more than dilatoriness is to be imputed to them, something very like a wish to deceive the country. Now this attempt at deceit seems to me to have been perfectly gratuitous, except on two suppositions, and they are these.

1. That ministers were afraid of stating this plan and proposing it, till some other person had thrown out the idea, and it had been well received. Acting in this way, they may conceive, that they will shift some of the responsibility of the measure from off their own shoulders; but most erroneously do they conceive this, in my opinion, if that is their idea; but at all events, if they think to get rid of the responsibility, they should also get rid of the merit, and give it where it is due. But, no: this is by no means their intention. If it is praised, they claim the merit, and say, "this is our real plan, we always meant that "it should come to this," if it is blamed, they can say, "this was not our scheme, it was the "House of Commons that made it what it was, "look at it as it was brought in, and so it went "through two readings and the Committee. If "the House would recommit it, we are not an- "swerable for what the Committee did." Weak and paltry as these subterfuges appear, they are, I assure you, no ways unworthy of our sapient Directors. However, I really acquit them of this intention, attributing their conduct to another motive, which is,

2. That they were afraid of stating the whole of the plan, for fear of alarming the country by an idea of danger, which made such a plan necessary. Now, I assert, that this plan is still inadequate to the danger, and therefore, stating the whole of the plan could not open the eyes of the nation to the whole of the danger; yet, still were they afraid of opening their eyes to so much of the danger as this plan is capable of obviating. I am aware of what you will say to this, and that you will argue, "how foolish to be desirous of "concealing from the country the magnitude of "the danger in which it stands; how can any "man expect that the country will be prepared "to meet and able to resist any danger, of "which the magnitude is quite unknown to him? "Much less one of which the magnitude is so "great, though the bare statement would frighten "him out of his wits." Very true, my dear friend, you are quite right—you reason very truly, and very well; but such reasoning is not suited to a "great commercial country," to a country like this, "whose strength is its riches," and who is to contend against the power of France by "capital, credit, and confidence." You reason for poor men, not for rich ones; for statesmen, not for merchants. These you must not frighten, though by failing to do so you may bring on them irretrievable ruin—they, poor fellows! have such delicate and ticklish nerves, that the very mention of the danger may set them into such a tremble, that there is no knowing what will happen. In short, we have a large National Debt—and we have Funds—that is the secret. A great many of the wealthiest subjects of the country have all their property in the funds—all the wealthy have so in a great degree—the country too is interested in having its credit great and its stocks high—any idea of danger or of instability frightens people and makes the funds sink, so that no one is to tell the country its danger lest its funds should be depressed; and no man is willing to confess his own apprehensions either by words or by deeds, or by making such preparations to resist it as shew that he does believe its existence; lest by so doing he should become poorer himself. This is the real truth, and this idea will open, I am sure, to your intelligent mind, the road to many grave and instructing reflections. Perhaps, if I have an opportunity hereafter I will take the liberty of troubling you with my ideas on this subject. I will at present only state the result of all my reflections; which is this, that we are now very rich, but very unsafe, and that to be safe, we must cease to be rich; that, in short, to be able to get the better of our enemy and to overcome the difficulties of our situation we must go through the process of what is called ruin. An intelligent friend of mine expressed this idea to me very forcibly the other day, talking of a certain great and opulent nobleman.—"We shall have, says he, a great struggle to "be saved, and never shall we be safe, till his "wife has worn camlet and mine linsey wool- "sey."——I am, &c. INQUISITOR.

FROM THE MORNING POST OF JULY 5, 1803.—THE INVASION.

If it were not for the language which is so often heard in society, it might seem perfectly absurd to labour the proof that Buonaparté will attempt invasion. Those who still profess to doubt it, must either be so stupid as to be beyond the reach of argument, or they must affect such doubts for purposes which they will not choose to avow, unless he be successful. His refusal to suffer the neutrality of Holland, is the most decided proof of his intention. That unhappy country will afford him no assistance but in a war of invasion. Her ports are convenient for the attack of the most defenceless part of this country. Her shipping are of a kind adapted to such expeditions. It is not that he can be supposed to feel any compassion for that wretched Republic, of which the war will complete the ruin. He is far above such weaknesses. But on any other system than that of invasion, Holland, increasing her wealth by commerce would afford much more substantial aid than she can do in war. He has accordingly allowed Spain to continue neutral, that he may reap the fruits of her American mines, because Spain has no coasts commodiously situated for the invasion of Great Britain. An invasion is in truth his only effectual means of hostility. On the Continent he has done his worst against this country. In India and America he can do little more than create some temporary mischief. England alone is the theatre of war, on which he can hope real harm to his enemy. He cannot engage in that final contest with Russia, for the em-

pire of the world, which his gigantic ambition already contemplates, unless he can deliver himself from England, which hangs on his rear; and if he could add the fleet of Great Britain to his own army, the empire of the world would cease to be a chimera. No region of the globe, from Pekin to Philadelphia, would then be safe from his banditti.—He has the bitter hatred of baffled rage against the only country which has braved his threats and spurned his dictates. He has the hatred of jealous despotism against the only free people whose example can ever animate his slaves to throw off his yoke. He has the hatred of mortified pride against the only people which dares to discuss his conduct, and to trace his bloody career from his massacre of the municipality of Pavia to his poisoning of his own wounded at Jaffa. He has the hatred of a robber who has plotted to enslave the whole earth against the nation which at least imprisons his plunderers in Europe. He has the hatred of a military barbarian for that nation, which, above all others, flourishes in the peaceable and useful arts of civilised life. He looks on us with the barbarous spite of Attila and Alaric, those "Scourges of God," whose successor and rival he is. Indeed the scale as well as character of his ambition is barbaric. It is to be matched only among these destroyers of the world. It is much too vast for the puny notions of European aggrandisement. He, who could talk of Switzerland and Piedmont, as "two trifles," and of Egypt, as what he meant to have, but was in no hurry about, must have a standard of ambition, in comparison with which Louis XIV. was only a robber of hen-roosts.—All the motives of hatred receive great additional force from the personal temper of the man.—His original character, compounded of Italian cunning, with the ferocity of the half-barbarous race from which he springs, strengthened in a recluse, a monkish youth, by the contemplation of the hardest parts of science, and by those wild and dark productions of fancy to which his gloomy mind was naturally attracted, fermented by a few crude notions of antient republicanism, which he imbibed during his scanty education, enflamed by all the scenes of rapine and blood, in which he has been a principal actor for the last ten years, has been wrought to a pitch of phrenzy by this sudden elevation to unbounded and irresistable power. He has lived in an age in which nothing can any longer be considered as improbable.—His own past history is more wonderful than any thing that he can effect in future. It was infinitely more improbable that a Corsican charity-schoolboy should be placed on the throne of Charlemagne than it now can be that the despotic master of the greatest part of Europe should become the master of the world. "All that "is difficult and all that is dire" have become child's play to his imagination. His fierce passions, which submit with the greatest impatience to the common decencies of civilised life, are inflamed to ungovernable madness by the restraint which he must sometimes impose on them. He adopts only enough of the arts and manners of civilization to cheat. He retains enough of his native barbarism to destroy. In short he is the *murderer of Jaffa!*—To all this distempered and malignant ambition, he adds that stern pride which is its natural companion, and which has been copiously nourished by the cowardice of that base age which he is doubtless employed by the justice of Heaven to punish. He has pledged himself to invade England, and he has never yet failed to redeem a pledge of mischief. The vow of enmity to mankind, which resounded through Pandemonium, was not more irrevocable than his vows of destruction. As to the danger of invasion, his whole life has been that of a desperate gambler accustomed to stake his existence upon a single cast. Indeed he cannot retreat. He has held out the plunder of England to his hordes. The plunder of England! Good God! What words! Into what times are we fallen when an insolent tyrant dares to utter them! But out these words have flown, he cannot recall them. It is but too true that he has represented us to his barbarians a race of rich cowards who offer an easy booty! It is but too true that they solicit employment in the army of England as an easy and almost bloodless road to an immense fortune! It is but too true that they dare to look on this great and gallant nation as a race of effeminate Asiatic slaves! An Englishman cannot speak of such execrable insolence without feeling his blood boil in his veins. And if any man bearing that honourable name can read of it without burning with impatience to inflict the most signal punishment on the insolent barbarians, and to wash out such an intolerable affront in their blood, may the infamous dastard be accursed to the last generations of mankind!—In one word, his policy leads him to attempt invasion, his furious passions goad him to it, his public pledges compel him to it. The chances are not so much against his being able to land as he said they were, nor did he believe what he said. But the chances are, no doubt, considerably against a landing. So

are the chances, in any single evening, against a man being robbed on Hounslow-heath. But the man would certainly be mad, who, if he were obliged to travel on that road, and to carry his whole fortune with him, did not prepare himself for an attack, and in every respect act as if he were sure of being attacked. It is childish to talk of guarding every point of such a sea, and of such a coast. The navy of England is the bravest and greatest that ever rode the ocean. But it cannot work miracles. Whatever depends on the winds and waves must be matter of chance. It is worse than childish to encourage a nation to trust her existence to chance, when it may be secured by valour. Those who prate of our safety behind wooden walls, are either drivellers, whose idiot chatter ought to be silenced at so serious a moment; or they are traitors, who sing the lullaby of death to the people.——There is not, there never was, there never will be, there never can be, any safety for the people of England, but in their own right arms. They are lost, if they do not act, as if there were a bridge from Calais to Dover. If there were, England could not be conquered, unless her people were as base cowards, as the tyrant dares to call them. If the conquerors of Cressy, of Blenheim, of Acre, of Alexandria, are content to pass for cowards; if they confirm by their baseness, all that the tyrant has said of them to his slaves; if our soldiers, our peasants, our yeomen, our manufacturers, be willing to surrender the whole of the national spirit to our sailors; if Englishmen be such dastards that they tremble to handle a musket on shore, and dare not face an enemy without the advantage of superior seamanship, then they ought to know that all the forests of Scandinavia will not make wooden walls firm enough to guard them. They, their wives, and their children, will be the slaves, the drudges, the scorn and mockery of the most hellish banditti that ever were let loose to scourge mankind. They will deserve it. They will not fall like the brave Swiss, amidst the tears and blessings of the world. They will not, like them, leave a name which will animate freemen against tyrants, as long as the globe exists. They will fall unpitied, unlamented, unrespected, like wretches, who have dared to look back on the glory of their fathers, to look in the faces of their smiling infants, and yet be cowards!—But God forbid that the impious vows of the tyrant should be thus accomplished.——No! The hearts of Englishmen are as stout, and their arms are as strong as they were at Cressy and Blenheim! The hero of Acre will not witness such disgrace! The conquerors of Alexandria will not be the slaves of an upstart Corsican and his enslaved barbarised Frenchmen!

THE GENEALOGY OF BRUTUS, ALY, NAPOLEONE BUONAPARTÉ.

From a pamphlet much circulated in France in 1800, called, "The Genealogy of the Corsican Successor to the French Bourbons, written in La Vendée, and printed in the Temple, by a Chouan," the following is an extract:

"After the disgrace of Theodore King of Corsica, the Republic of Genoa published an official paper to make him and his adherents more ridiculous and despised, intitled, 'A List of all Persons ennobled by the Adventurer, calling himself King Theodore of Corsica;' this list was printed by the widow Rossi, at Genoa, in 1744, and contains, pages six and seven, some curious remarks upon the Usurper's family, more to be depended on than those which fear, interest, meanness, and adulation have fabricated, since he seated himself upon the throne of the Bourbons.

"When in May 3, 1736, Porto Vecchio was attacked, a butcher from Ajaccio, called JOSEPHO BUONA, brought a seasonable assistance with a band of vagabonds and robbers, who, during the civil troubles, had chosen him for their leader; in return King Theodore, on the 4th of May of the same year, created him a nobleman, and permitted him, as a memorandum of his services, to add to his name *Buona* the final termination *parté*; his wife's name was HISTRIA, daughter of a journeyman tanner, at Bastia. The father of JOSEPHO BUONA, CARLO BUONA, kept a wine house for sailors; but being accused and convicted of murder and robbery, he died a galley slave at Genoa, 1724; his wife, as an accomplice, and who, on account of her extremely vicious character, was called La Birba, died in 1730, in the house of correction at Geneva; those were the grand and great grand parents of his CONSULAR MAJESTY.

"Who his father was is well known, and that he served and betrayed by turns his country during the civil wars. After France had conquered Corsica, he was the spy to the French Governors, and his wife their mistress. From this pure and virtuous source descends BRUTUS, ALY, NAPOLEONE BUONAPARTÉ, the successor of the Bourbons, born in a country whose inhabitants were in the time of the Romans held in such detestation, on account of their infamous and treacherous disposition, that they would not have them even for their slaves.

"At Toulon, in 1793, the upstart signed his reports *Brutus Buonaparté*,* and he now signs only BUONAPARTÉ, no doubt with a wish to have the world forget, that the BRUTUS of ROBESPIERRE, and ALY of the Directory, is the self-same NAPOLEONE BUONAPARTÉ who is at present the tyrant of France and the plague of Europe."

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* In a report to ROBESPIERRE the younger, BARRAS and FREERON, Deputies of the National Convention; this report was dated Toulon, Dec. 28, 1793, the second year of the French Republic, one and indivisible.

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